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Wanee 1
Premise
Twenty years ago, the concept of active and constantly evolving Chinese engagement
with African states appeared obsolete, with the exception of the remnants of post-communism
relationships following the Cold War. Within the past decade, the decline of Western attention
on African states and negative memories of Western colonialism has created the opportunity for
China to establish a more prominent presence on the continent, and in recent years Sino-African
relations have only escalated. A variety of consequences have begun to emerge from the rapidly
growing presence of China in less-than-developed countries, both positive and negative;
however, China expresses its intent to cultivate mutual cooperation among nations.
While preoccupied predominantly in the Middle East, the United States of America has
failed to maintain a personal rapport with the governments of most African states. Far from the
frequent, in-person visits to African heads of state by Chinese military leaders and diplomats, the
United States had shifted its focus from the continent until recently, as it has begun to realize the
growing influence of its strategic competitor, China. The U.S. and China have maintained at the
least a peripheral awareness of each other’s actions on the global stage, including their
interactions in the United Nations Security Council. As China continues to gain influence as a
political actor in an increasingly multi-polar world, the United States has experienced unfamiliar
limitations of its power and grows more conscious of Chinese strategies and objectives. The
venue for Sino-U.S. interactions has begun to shift from the Far East, where China has labored to
ameliorate its status as a developing nation, to the African continent where China may emerge as
a strategic competitor to the globally hegemonic United States.
No longer an adversary, nor a partner, the Sino-U.S. relationship is marked by strategic
competition for the ever-changing responses to current events on a global stage. In order to
assess the implications of a shift in venue in the political arena for China and the United States,
one must explore the current strategies of Chinese engagement in Africa and attempt to
determine the nation’s goals on the continent. One must examine why China has chosen to
engage this region, at this time, and what its long-term motivations and incentives may be.
Currently, China and the United States have intertwined political and economic interests, and an
analysis of China’s impact in Africa can help determine where the U.S. and China have an
opportunity for mutual cooperation in the future.
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Equally important to U.S. response are the global implications of a Sino-African
relationship. As often depicted in research, analysts consider the mutual benefits or
consequences of Chinese engagement in Africa. No longer solely an economic endeavor,
research either lauds the cultural and political—even military—interactions between China and
many African states, or it disparages Chinese practices, including the One-China policy. The
One-China policy offered African states the opportunity for a partnership without Chinese
interference or strings attached, as long as the African government recognized China’s
legitimacy (with its capitol in Beijing) over any ties to Taiwain. In light of China’s amplified
activity on the African continent in both the economic and political realms, it is becoming more
evident that China seeks to rise as a global power in the international arena.
Today, news media outlets tend to portray the ascent of Chinese power in Africa as a
negative phenomenon, and while the U.S. may face the threat of sacrificing full immunity in its
future actions to the greater international interest, the chance to collaborate between major world
powers could reap benefits for African states and the international community. In areas that the
Chinese relationship succeeds and trumps Western strategies (which are often marked by
adherence to the “Washington Consensus” plan), the United States and international community
can work to cooperate and promote positive practices; on the other hand, one must determine
how to combat the detrimental results of Chinese involvement on the African continent in a way
that will not jeopardize opportunities for mutual cooperation between all parties. Overall, among
the progressive relationship between China and Africa, an predominant theme causes one to
wonder how the United States fits—if it does at all—into the larger perspective of Sino-African
relations and where it can move forward as alliances have begun to emerge, and more successful
than those attempted by Western powers.
Regarding strategic competition, the United States has the opportunity to apply a range of
its power to protect its own interests in cooperating with China, especially through its position as
a dominant global leader. China may be a rising world power, but it still has flaws where the
United States can apply leverage; in particular, Chinese investment and relationship building
revolves around its non-interference, One-China policy. Thus, Chinese business relations—
especially in the realm of arms proliferation—often contribute to investments in corrupt
governments that commit human rights atrocities against their own citizens without any
stipulations or condemning statements from the Chinese. On the other hand, African
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governments have more of an opportunity today to take control of their countries’ needs and
desires, and China’s strategic interactions entice many African leaders over Western principles
for engagement.
As it rises to power on the global stage, is China ready to face the responsibilities of the
international community to protect individuals when their governments will not offer safety?
Indeed, China has begun to orchestrate a charm offensive that includes soft power strategies and
minimizing criticism so as to assert a better image to the rest of the world. However, it has a
variety of motivations for engaging Africa, which this paper will examine, and it still interacts
with corrupt governments much to the chagrin of the international community. Currently, China
touts a strict policy of protecting state sovereignty and non-interference in a country’s affairs;
yet, even this line grows blurrier as Chinese initiatives in Africa include infrastructure, health,
and even education practices in an almost neo-colonialist endeavor. Furthermore, cultural
exchanges and aid investment have begun to ameliorate African debt and promote understanding
and optimism between continents.
As it begins to entrench itself ever deeper into the African continent, China has an
advantage with the African people that the United States lacks. Along with the strong qualities
that the United States possesses in the international realm, its relations with China could provide
for compensation each other’s weaker traits and provide a real opportunity for change and
cooperation in Africa. Where China’s endeavors might negatively affect the African people,
namely in the fueling of human rights offenses, the United States has the opportunity to respond
in a way that can create leverage and seek progress for the international community’s protection
of citizens. While it may take a paradigm shift for China to readjust its concepts of political
sovereignty and non-intervention, the potential of strategic competition to turn into mutual
cooperation can offer the United States a chance to uphold its declared ideologies of civil liberty
and build upon its current relationship with China and Africa to move it in a more positive
direction, while respecting the desires of the African communities.
To begin, one must determine the context of Chinese goals and motivations for
engagement, beyond mere economic pursuit, and examine how Chinese strategies differ from
those of the West. Furthermore, the Sino-African relationship requires assessment to determine
its positive and negative aspects in order to discern opportunities for a mutually beneficial
relationship and to dispel negative practices that harm African citizens and the international
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community. Finally, the U.S. must inspect the range of options for dealing with a shift in the
international political venue to the African frontier, as well as the pragmatism and validity of its
potential responses to the Sino-African relationship in a shifting world order. This paper will
take into consideration the aforementioned aspects of Sino-African relations and assess within
that framework the implications and options available for the United States.

Literature Review

China’s interest in the African continent has increased in the last decade and major
players in international politics, including the United States, have grown increasingly more
aware and speculative about China’s actions and intentions. Western media has started
portraying Chinese engagement with Africa as alarming, but an understanding of China’s
purpose in Africa is lost amidst the assumptions and lack of up to date information. Scholars
have lately begun to delve into progressively more complex nature of Sino-African relations and
how the partnership affects other players that have interests in the region. Leading up to the year
2011, the information available has increased in accordance with China’s mounting presence on
the African continent. Research for this paper in particular has incorporated Chinese, Western,
and African perspectives.
Because the Sino-African topic is an emerging area of study, the nature of China’s
engagement with Africa constantly changes and significant questions remain under examination
throughout available resources on the subject. Approaches for examination differ in degrees of
broad to more narrow focuses, and may illustrate the effects of Chinese engagement in specific
regions of Africa or overall. Discord exists between the information fed to the Western world
from the media and a sound framework of scholarly analysis. Researchers ponder topics such as
the purpose/intent of Chinese penetration—is it marked with underlying factors or more explicit
and obvious? In what areas and with what types of influence is China exerting? What resources
does China pursue, and does that pursuit reflect a general approach or specialized tactics in
specific regions or states? How does Chinese intervention affect intra-state conflicts and corrupt
governments and leadership, either subliminally or through backdoor diplomacy—and with
strategies ranging from arms dealing to fueling armed conflict with investment? How does
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China’s approach clash or identify with U.S. foreign policy tactics, and the countries’
relationship as strategic competitors?
Furthermore, political scientists and economists tend to contemplate the consequences or
mutual benefits of this rising global South-South alliance for not only China and African states,
but for the Western world and the United States. The media of the Western world relies on
sensational stories and plays upon the idea of a Chinese threat to nations like the United States or
the collective European Union. With more in depth analysis, however, scholars portray either a
negative or positive perspective when approaching any aspect of Sino-African observation. With
the potential for a mutually beneficial relationship to emerge among African states and the
Chinese government, optimism surfaces and sheds an encouraging light upon the range of
opportunities China can offer to underdeveloped countries. Nevertheless, academics have
condemned a few Chinese practices, including its arms dealings with volatile regions in Africa,
and have exposed the need for improvement and pressure from the international community to
maintain accountability for human rights issues. Due to the emerging and still ambiguous nature
of Chinese motives and African responses to the developing relationships, no collectively
distinct view of African intellectuals exists. However, independent analysts and activists among
African civil society groups have begun to form perceptions of Chinese engagement, especially
reliant upon a commitment to human rights and social justice.
Even more disconcerting for promoters of democracy, China has established rapport with
governments without the precursory recommendation of a democratic government. The Chinese
model of aid, which has involved the cancellation of numerous African debts and given wealthy
gifts to improve African infrastructure, education, and health care capacities, professes no prior
stipulations to assistance. Scholars have noticed successful investment relationships emerging in
the midst of oppressive regimes, which leads to speculation about previous proclamations that
democracy must be established to ensure a state’s success and economic development. Despite
unorthodox Chinese tactics, no longstanding examples of African success stories have exhibited
that democratic tendencies can be ruled out altogether as an option for stability and sustainable
development.
In accordance with China’s unique approach to non-interference, government aid, and
now its soft power policies, the questions surrounding Chinese aid for African states contributes
to the discussion of motive and incentive for engagement on the continent. As studies begin to
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indicate Western flaws in their approaches to foreign aid, how does China’s approach to
assistance differ? Do Chinese investment and trade practices harm local economies, or do aid
packages ease burdens to alleviate poverty and spur African states into self-reliant development?
It is necessary to examine the ties that bind China to Africa surrounding generous gifts, as well
as to determine the implications or the opportunities made available for African states.
Further analysis permits one to discern Chinese needs versus desires in engaging the
African continent. Authors may examine the extent to which China partakes in cultivating an
intimate relationship with African heads of state and the possibility of neocolonialism; assertions
arise that China wants to modify its image, potentially disguise policy goals, and try to avoid the
impression of imperialism as it seeks to rise as a global power. Indeed, it has set itself apart from
previous Western approaches in Africa with its own unique Chinese model of engagement, but
the full extent of the effectiveness of such a model remains debatable. China can relate to many
African states in a global South-South context due to its own history of development and a past
marked by divisive warlords, Maoist communism, and its changing economic policies.
In uncovering motivations and rationale for Chinese partnerships with African nations,
researchers have only just begun to develop a proper U.S. reaction to the blossoming political,
cultural, and economic changes resulting from Sino-African relations. For example, could the
U.S. provide leverage to either cooperate or reign in China concerning human rights abuses or
threats to U.S. investments? China’s actions are constantly under review, especially with the
historical context of its own fears of foreign influence and how it values its identity and state
autonomy. It has begun to set itself apart with its One-China policy of non-interference in
African states’ government affairs, and its initiatives on the continent differ from past Western
tactics and methods of colonization. Undoubtedly, research reveals the similar backgrounds
between African states and China, from past struggles to current desires to overcome challenges
and rise to prominence by working together.
An ever-impending question, spectators of the Sino-African phenomenon wonder about
the impact of such relations upon the United States’ interests as a strategic competitor of China.
Depending upon the positive or negative outlook assumed by analysts regarding the global
implications that stem from this budding relationship, one must consider the nature with which
global powers conduct their foreign policy initiatives and responses. For example, fostering
cooperation between the U.S. and China in the region may prove necessary for mutual
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coexistence and preserving each party’s interests, but at the same time, political leverage is a
valuable tool for more sensitive topics like genocide. Within this emerging field, research
studies involve such aspects as development and alliances in the Global South, changes in global
and local markets, environmental consequences, and energy policies. An added complexity,
intra-state conflict and the acknowledgement of Chinese arms deals emerge as a more prevalent
topic of concern in research and news media reports.
Though investment and global trade are key contributors to the analysis of Sino-African
and U.S. foreign policy relationships, this paper will also examine the political motivations of
China and its strategic approach to the African continent. It will assess the relationship China
shares with African governments and civil society groups in order to highlight opportunities for
mutual cooperation and understanding, and then it will compare the U.S. strategy in the region to
determine the implications of the Sino-African relationship in an increasingly globalized world.
Academics have noticed that China recognizes and allies with African states in international
forums and venues, such as the United Nations, to promote shared values and policies.
Furthermore, China gives African states the chance to participate in global affairs, and it
promotes their input and opinions on a predominantly Western international stage. The SinoAfrican partnership possibly represents hope for a multi-polar world in which a plurality of
powers can exercise influence in international policymaking. As an additional note, China’s
intent to ascend in the global arena corresponds with the assertion of influence by other
developing nations like Brazil, Russia, and India. China’s actions merit attention from the
United States because the two powers often cross paths as strategic competitors in the
international community, but they are not the only power that seeks to increase its influence in
the nations of the Global South.
Thus far, I have unearthed a wealth of relevant journal articles, books, and miscellaneous
sources for the implementation of my research. I had primarily focused on Western reactions to
Chinese engagement in Africa, but I have also acquired an anthology of African perspectives that
rely upon independent analysts and activists in order to provide a context of civil society
reactions to the Chinese presence on the African continent. I have explored both positive and
negative responses to the Sino-African partnership; especially interesting are the denouncements
that continuously comprise the negative analyses of Chinese practices, because a timid pattern
has begun to draw attention to Western hypocrisy and its less-than-angelic actions from past to
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present. It is important to correctly factor in colonial practices from Western international
relations to foster an understanding and sensitivity involving Western accusations against China
opportunities in order to develop effective accountability tactics for the rising global power.
Primarily, the research for this paper involved the perspectives of key scholars in the
Sino-African field like Deborah Brautigam, Ambassador David Shinn, and Zhiqun Zhu. In
Brautigam’s recent book, The Dragon’s Gift, the author sorts through myths surrounding
Chinese motivations and attempts to illustrate a realistic portrayal of China’s engagement with
the African continent. This paper draws heavily from her research, as Brautigam provides a
thorough background of China’s past relations with Africa, current practices in the context of
Chinese culture, and the effects of Chinese aid as a part of its larger goal to rise to global
prominence.
In addition, I included a variety of articles, op-eds, and even interviews from George
Washington University’s Ambassador David Shinn, who has had firsthand experience with both
Africa and China. For the past decade, he has analyzed the fledgling Sino-African partnership
and his research provides documentation and a framework for the evolving nature of the presentday Sino-African relationship. On the other hand, Zhiqun Zhu has observed the ever-changing
tactics in Chinese diplomacy since the 1990s, and he discusses Africa as a part of China’s global
extension in his book China’s New Diplomacy. The subtitle of his book, “Rationale, Strategies
and Significance,” explains his predominant focus in assessing China’s approach to the African
continent. Both Zhu and Shinn have examined China’s movements in the past two decades and
can offer insight into how China operates as applicable to Africa; the two scholars have provided
a large amount of research and ideas for this paper.
Aside from a variety of other journal articles, another critical component of my research
involved a collection of African responses to Chinese engagement in the anthology African
Perspectives on China in Africa. The conglomeration of texts represents the most important
players in the nuanced relationship with China and the Western world: the Africans themselves.
Such a variety of contexts for Sino-African study and the implications stemming
from the blooming relationship have offered a broad basis for analysis. Mixed perspectives have
appeared on all sides of the spectrum concerning China’s mingling with African states. While
studies often rely heavily upon an economic component for portraying the Sino-African
relationship, this paper will examine a variety of Chinese motivations and African responses, the
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overarching theme of positive versus negative repercussions for the Sino-African relationship,
and attempts to shed insight into U.S. reactions and the global implications that have begun to
emerge in the past decade.
Finally, the Sino-African relationship fascinates me because I have an interest in the
complex history, politics, and culture of China; especially because I traveled to China for three
weeks and learned from a native Chinese professor and my interactions with Chinese students.
Contrasted with my undergraduate study of African politics and my work for an organization that
constantly remains updated on human rights concerns on the African continent, I pull from my
own understanding and backgrounds concerning both China and Africa and meld that with my
personal heritage as a citizen of the United States. In my thesis, I seek to reconcile the
information I have researched and have placed into a framework from firsthand experiences to
gain a better understanding of the Sino-African relationship and apply it as relevant to the United
States.

Abstract
Recently, the U.S. and China have entered into the realm of strategic competition; Africa now
serves an additional venue for their nuanced relationship. In an increasingly multipolar world,
China’s rise as a prominent international power shifts global dynamics, and implications for the
United States have begun to evolve. All three parties have interests at stake. While this paper
will examine Chinese motivations and the United States response (or lack thereof) to
engagement of Africa, it will also consider African interests and a need to avoid exploitation.
China intends to successfully cultivate relationships that African leaders will turn into alliances;
thus, it expresses the desire for such relations to be mutually beneficial. Following the initial
examination of China’s approach to Africa, this paper will assess the potential for mutual benefit
to flourish between nations. Furthermore, in the context of an increasingly multipolar world it
will assess the implications for the United States as an international power and why the SinoAfrican relationship requires attention. Most importantly, the United States can improve its own
strategy in Africa and learn from the Chinese, as well as collaborate within the framework of
strategic competition so that it can protect its interests abroad.

Old Actors, New Drama:
Chinese Engagement with Africa and the Implications for the United States

By Megan R. Wanee
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Intro

“America’s absence in Africa is ‘as noticeable and prominent as the Chinese presence,’
commented then Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.) in 2006.”1 Although seemingly exaggerated,
United States President Obama’s observation of China’s growing engagement on the African
continent contains elements of truth. Evermore, China’s influence emerges throughout the
African continent, while the United States’ legitimacy seems to wane. When considering the rate
of growth among Chinese endeavors compared to the lack of progress the United States faces
with African nations, one must wonder what exactly it is that the Chinese are doing and how
their approach generally affects the African states. Obama’s statement perhaps reflects a dismal
foreshadowing of the decline of United States’ influence in the international arena; yet, as China
begins its ascent as a world power, are such fears unfounded?

China and the African states exist on two separate continents, and at first it seems that the
two regions have little in common. Both contain developing nations whose budding relationship
appears to have little pertinence to the United States. Ranging from scholars to average
individuals, Chinese and African relations call forth mixed reactions. Often, the average
American perceives the idea of Chinese engagement of Africa as distant and irrelevant to the
United States. However, those who are on a sort of “China watch,” keeping an eye on the
movements of China as it rapidly grows and its influence expands, portray Sino-African relations
as an emerging frontier in a growing struggle between the United States and China—even
sometimes as a threat. Despite the attention of non-profit and public policy groups, the media
typically portrays the continent as hopeless and wrought with conflict. It has even begun to decry
China as a threat to United States’ dominant position in the international arena. While a variety
of factors, including China’s own internal affairs and efforts to develop, prevent it from
achieving the caliber of international influence that the United States exercises, it will no longer
remain confined within its own borders. Looking ahead, the United States must not ignore the

1

Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Burlington:
Ashgate Publishing Co., 2010), 42.
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movements of China and the nature of its relations with Africa if it strives to maintain its own
relevance and the power it enjoys in the international arena.

Emerging as hot topic of study and occasional source of sensational media stories,
Chinese and African relations are often described as a recent phenomenon. However, China has
interacted with African states as far back as the 15th century; it simply does not share the same
exploitative and intrusive history as the European colonial powers who have left deep, nuanced
scars across the continent. In recent years, China has escalated its previously nominal role in
Africa: “Only since the mid-1990s has China re-discovered Africa’s economic and diplomatic
values and begun large-scale investment and trade. The basis of Sino-African relations has
evolved from politics and ideology in the 1960s and 1970s to economics and pragmatic
cooperation today.”2 During the 20th century, China involved itself primarily in ideological
struggles during the Cold War. Its strategy has since shifted because in the 1990s, China began
to experiment with capitalistic tendencies in its own economy and witness some internal
stabilization and growth. Eventually, it recognized an opportunity to extend more than its
political ideology abroad, and it expanded its focus on new markets available in Africa, a
continent that Western opportunists have gradually vacated.

During the economic crisis of the 1980s and the winding down of Cold War tension, the
United States had largely begun to pull out of Africa and create a vacuum for investment that the
Chinese saw as an opportunity. Arriving in post-independence Africa to construct infrastructure
and manage state-owned factories, China’s exertion went unnoticed by Western donors;
however, African states recognized Chinese presence and many granted the Chinese legitimacy
and credibility for their work.3 China and the United States vary in their own patterns of
development and in their approach to international politics and business with Africa.
Unfortunately, the United States often perceives the African continent as conflicted and hopeless,
while the Chinese have begun to experiment ways to collaborate with African leaders—and to
mounting success.

2
3

Zhu, 22.
Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: the Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 310.
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As the Western world begins to notice a more prominent Chinese presence on the African
continent, analysts question why the Chinese have chosen this particular region of the world in
which to focus their attention as of late. China has had an extensive history of relations with
African states, but they have taken a less intrusive form than Western colonial endeavors. After
the African economic crisis of the 1980s deterred international investment on the continent, the
U.S. attention in the region has diminished. Private groups and non-profit organizations have
certainly drawn attention to humanitarian crises on the African continent; however, the economic
disaster of the 1980s proved a setback to African progress. Originally, the United States had an
array of ventures and investments in African states, but with post-independence and the
economic crisis of the 1980s, they began to turn their attention elsewhere: “Aid for
manufacturing and infrastructure dropped to historic lows. The traditional donors left a vacuum,
and who was there, ready to step in? The Chinese.”4 China recognized an opportunity, and
stepped up their role in Africa to fill the holes left by Western powers. The post-Mao recovery
and development of China’s own economy had sidetracked China from its ability to focus on
foreign aid let alone develop any lasting strategic involvement in Africa. However, China never
completely left Africa alone, though its giving and investment may have slowed.

This paper will address the motivations and strategies of Chinese engagement of Africa,
and its significance for the United States as a strategic competitor of China. The nature of
strategic competition does not entail direct antagonism; it implies a relationship in which each
party protects its own interests and remains knowledgeable about its opponent’s actions in order
to remain a viable contender—in this case, for international prominence. China’s swelling
power cannot yet match that of the United States, but it may in the future: “Nonetheless,
Beijing’s global outreach does appear consistent with longer-term political goals to promote a
multipolar world and to protect itself against the preeminent power of the United States, while
placing itself in a position to potentially balance against, if not compete strategically with, the
United States once China achieves greater strength.”5 China seeks to match U.S. power in the

4
5

Brautigam, 77.
Fred C. Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek Mitchell. "Global Strategic
Competition." China Balance Sheet. CSIS & Peterson Institute.
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080916_cbs_1_globalcomp.pdf. (accessed 25 April 2011).
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long-term. While the African continent does not always appear the most appealing location for
foreign policy engagement and the U.S. often wonders what it can gain from giving attention to
under-developed states, the U.S. should not abandon its interests in Africa because China has set
its attention on the continent as a part of its strategic competition. If the United States’ foreign
policy fails on the African continent and China becomes the predominant global partner in the
region, China will have the advantage of a wealth of markets and resources, as well as the
diplomatic support necessary for alliances in the international community. Clearly, the United
States and China do not share a common background, nor do they share basic beliefs in how a
country should approach politics and human rights. In spite of their differences, China and the
United States do not face a zero-sum game. While each country has differing intentions and
tactics, they can minimize the potential for conflict and in some instances event cooperate with
each other.

Gradually, the United States has realized that strategic competition extends to the African
continent as China’s focus grows there and it begins to assert its advancement towards
international leadership. In the context of its role with the United States, it is necessary to
examine the implications of China’s strategy in Africa and how it differs from that of the
Western powers. One must study the motivations of China’s engagement of Africa and the
strengths and weaknesses that have thus far ensued. Because China often lacks transparency in
its interactions with African leaders, the United States tends to take a speculative, skeptical
approach to Chinese actions in Africa. Indeed, China has not had a very clean record with its
internal relations and human rights. Yet, the United States must examine its own past and
present with African states. It must also strive for greater understanding of Chinese strategy and
motivations on the African continent to determine the context for the assumptions it makes and
to construct an appropriate response. Additionally, this fledgling field of study requires an
examination of China’s assertion to create a mutually beneficial relationship with Africa, and if
the United States can leverage its interests in upholding a similar policy.

Naturally global dynamics constantly shift, but the United States’ role as dominant figure
in international politics no longer remains completely secure, at least in the forward-looking
perspective. Evermore, African nations view China as an alternative to their previous reliance on
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Western powers. The United States must reexamine its role in the international arena, assess
opportunities for self-improvement, and determine areas in which it can uphold its beliefs and
promote its interests to the benefit, rather than the detriment, of other states (especially in
Africa). As a part of strategic competition, the U.S. must protect its interests abroad to maintain
the power it currently enjoys in the global arena; but it must work on building a more positive
image and partnerships with states that will be mutually beneficial. The Sino-African
relationship, as it grows, will further encourage the United States to realistically reexamine its
policies and goals. A little competition could prove healthy to spur the United States into trying
new approaches and becoming more understanding and aware of how it conducts its
relationships with other states. African states have begun to lose faith in the United States
strategy, whereas China experiments with different approaches that they constantly revise in
hopes of finding the correct combination of efficiency and effectiveness.

Overall, as China cultivates its relationship with African states and begins to build a longterm presence on the continent, discussions have emerged questioning the implications for Africa
and for the United States as a global leader. Will China’s presence resemble the colonialist
exploitation of previous powers that have tried to partner with Africa? Is China simply looking
for new markets, or is it attempting to pursue a bigger strategy that could have implications for
the United States? Clearly, the venue for U.S. - Chinese relations has now expanded from their
own borders to include Africa as a playing field in the international arena, and it competes both
economic and diplomatic interests against one another in strategic competition. As globalization
amplifies and alters international relationships, the United States and China face an increasing
overlap of interests and tense up at the possibility of conflict; yet, opportunities for collaboration
exists. In order to determine an appropriate reaction of the United States to Chinese engagement
in Africa, one must evaluate their current foreign policy approaches. This paper will analyze the
roles of three very different players in the international arena: China, the United States, and
Africa. It will examine the motivations of Chinese engagement of Africa within a positive or
negative framework, as well as the possibility of a mutually beneficial relationship between the
two parties. Finally, it will assess the implications of the Sino-African relationship in the context
of strategic competition between the United States and China in an increasingly globalized
world.
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Part I.
While the African continent may seem an unusual location for China to focus its
attention, the region is increasingly growing into an opportunity. With the ever-rapid pace of
globalization, the U.S. faces the rising influence of the European Union and the BRIC nations:
Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Especially in the context of the changing international arena
and the precarious perception of the United States’ future on the continent, the U.S. must at the
least recognize the potential for competition from these developing entities; it must also ponder
how China’s assertion of power beyond its borders will affect the polarity of the world order.

To place the recent escalation of Chinese engagement of Africa in context, note that the
United States is only recently beginning to fully comprehend the complexity of China’s presence
on the continent: “Aid to Africa would increase, even as it dropped in other significant regions,
such as Asia. This gave China a steady presence, credibility, and a strong foundation that Beijing
would build on in the years after 1995. China’s increased visibility in Africa today should be
seen in this context: China never left, we just stopped looking.”6 Indeed, China has more
recently increased its assertion of influence, but it had maintained steady positive relations with
the continent for years before it began to do so. They have played at the least a minor role in
African foreign policy and development, and the United States should not be surprised that the
Chinese have escalated their strategy for engagement. Recognizing a gradual drain of United
States’ support and investment over the past decades, China began to modify and amplify its own
strategy to effectively build rapport with the African states: China’s policy statements on Africa
began encouraging enterprises to invest and help build infrastructure, “something the West has
been reluctant to do in recent years. And it promised to help Africa raise the level of tourism,
reduce its debt, and increase economic assistance. The policy statement called for comprehensive
cooperation in the fields of education, science and technology, culture, medicine and health,
media, the environment, and disaster relief.”7 Though the Chinese have had a longstanding
rapport with Africa, it has not amounted yet to the same level of intimacy between African states
6
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and traditional Western donors like the United States. Nonetheless, in a constant struggle to
fully develop and maintain self-sufficiency, the African have states gradually noticed the
intensification of Chinese engagement as opposed to growing Western disengagement.

More and more, the United States’ attention has shifted over the past couple of decades
from combating Cold War tension to the Middle East and counterterrorism. Even Sino-U.S.
relations have escalated, as the Chinese economy rapidly grows and morphs into a perceived
international contender in the global arena. Contrastingly, Africa has descended on the priority
list of the United States as a promising venue for investment, mostly due to the high levels of
poverty, unstable governments, and risks that may outweigh the benefits of conducting
successful business ventures: “Unlike American business people, who are generally risk-averse
and spoiled in terms of the personal lifestyle they expect, the Chinese take economic risks for the
prospect of gain, and Chinese workers will go and live anywhere. In contrast, American
companies have always had difficulty finding people to work in Africa.”8 Whereas the United
States no longer needs African business to thrive, China has had to explore available options for
new markets.

China has intensified its relationship in align with a refinement of its own goals and
strategic interests because it can do so now. Its internal shift to a more capitalist economy has led
to an opening of China and availability of exchange, as well as a search for new markets. As
China has seized the opportunity to strengthen its presence and relationship with Africans, it
introduces new competition to the Western presence on the continent. The Chinese have
initiated a campaign for increased global participation and renown, and the United States has
recognized them as a viable counterpart and potential contender for global influence. Now, the
United States has another location in which the Chinese seek to match and potentially one day
exceed their efforts at alliance-building and economic endeavor.

Should increased Chinese engagement alarm the U.S. or African players involved?
“A huge concern is that currently China and Western relations with Africa are being approached
from a competitive point of view. A way should be sought to combine these efforts to maximise
8
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the benefit for Africa.”9 Indeed, concern for competition and the protection of each side’s
sovereign interests has emerged in Sino-U.S. relations, but it is also necessary to examine the
way in which such competition or collaboration affects the African people. While a venue shift
has occurred, the inhabitants of the venue must not suffer at the hands of competing interests. As
previously noted, Western media tends to portray China’s presence in Africa as negative. While
China’s approach is not perfect, sensationalism has racked up insecurity and alarm on behalf of
the U.S. Nevertheless: “Following talks in Beijing at the end of 2005, Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, commented that she did not believe the U.S. is in direct
competition with China in Africa. She added that it would be a mistake to ‘consider China an
adversary in Africa.’”10 The United States should not allow the media to distract it during its
analysis and dealings between Africa and China; rather, it is necessary that it guards its interests
and is pragmatic, while keeping an open mind for opportunities to collaborate for mutual benefit
amongst the three key parties involved. The United States must remember that China’s intent to
ascend to global prominence is not unusual: “First, China’s activity is part of its continuing
emergence as a truly global player, and as such is no different from what major powers
traditionally have done.”11 Rather than nurture bitterness, it must assess the complexities of
China’s motivations and strategies to determine the positive and/or negative aspects of
engagement and how it can be interpreted for the African people and the United States’ own
strategy.

In an attempt to better understand Chinese strategy in Africa, one must primarily sift
through the motivations backing engagement and determine to what extent they are optimistic.
The West has portrayed Chinese engagement as both positive and negative—with opportunities
for mutual benefit for the two parties involved. Often, the misconception emerges that China has
a malevolent plan, or some grand scheme that guides their actions. However: “This belief in the
‘grand strategy’ also underpins assumptions that the investments of Chinese companies are
9
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masterminded by Beijing, with the single-minded goal of channeling natural resources back to
China.”12 Initially, one might assume that China has solely amplified its courtship of Africa to
take advantage of its vast wealth of resources and minerals. Of course, such a benefit is only one
factor of longer-term goals that China has begun to develop over the past decade.

It is becoming increasingly clear that while China may not have a masterminded plan that
dictates its interactions with the Africans states, it has set its focus upon long term engagement in
Africa, reaffirmed by Brautigam: “[China’s] embrace of the continent is strategic, planned, longterm, and still unfolding.”13 China has asserted its intention to strengthen its ties with African
states, as the West missed the exact moment in which China began to intensify its engagement.
Suddenly, China seemed to come out of nowhere as a legitimate, growing presence. Despite
initial skepticism: “As should be clear by now, Beijing’s engagement with Africa involved a
well-thought-out and long-term strategy, not the hasty, desperate scramble familiar from media
headlines.”14 Reiterating what analysts of Sino-African relations have deduced, China has now
made it known that it will take risks to ensure the success of its diplomacy and economic
investment abroad. Furthermore, China intends to shape the path of its engagement so as to
minimize risks and promote sustainable partnerships. In particular, China seeks to harvest
stability in order to cultivate healthy business relationships, rather than encourage exploitation.
Africa’s globalization strategy seeks business opportunities, not merely natural resources: “The
Chinese are linking business and aid in innovative ways.”15 China’s overarching approach to
engagement involves the development of an environment in which efficient business and trade
practices can occur and continue. African states have struggled with stability in the past and that
has hindered their progress, but China wants to invest in their future. Clearly China has
glimpsed opportunity in Africa, and it wants to capitalize upon that potential.

Along with the explicit economic intent of Chinese engagement with Africa, a
compilation of motivations drives China’s approach. Primarily, three basic components
comprise Chinese incentives: economic, diplomatic, and geo-political. The United States must
12
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attempt to understand the fundamentals of the Chinese approach in Africa to ascertain that which
they value. The more that the U.S. comprehends Chinese intentions, the better it can apply that
knowledge during efforts to collaborate or to use in leverage.

Most apparent to those outside the Sino-African relationship, China’s economic
endeavors appear to fuel engagement. China’s own economy has experienced a rapid escalation
of growth, and it has begun to expand its ventures to new markets that include Africa’s. It has
identified its need to pursue markets through overseas investment, the establishment of factories
and brand names for the global recognition of Chinese companies as well as property acquisition.
In accordance with most of the world, China desires the vast array of rich resources in Africa,
too; it seeks to develop sustainable access to commodities such as oil, copper, and cobalt.
Zhiqun Zhu explains that “[…] a top priority of China’s diplomatic activities in Africa is to
acquire energy and raw materials to fuel China’s galloping economy.” In accordance, “China is
relentlessly searching for new sources of oil globally. China’s fast-rising involvement with
Africa grows out of its immense need for natural resources […] China often uses infrastructure
projects to sweeten oil and mining deals.”16 China contrives useful projects and loans supported
by resource acquisition to satisfy its needs, but it also orchestrates such deals to the benefit of
Africa. Swiftly outgrowing its supply base, China must step outside its comfort zone to seek
new markets. Mark Sorbara states “Investing in African extractive industries is a risky business,
but China is desperately in need of raw materials to feed its booming economy, hence the
government is willing to shoulder most of the risk for Chinese companies looking to invest in
Africa.”17 Contrary to the United States, who has established partners for trade in natural
resources, China has to find new partnerships without a strong base of support or the luxury of a
safety net.

Though it may seem contrary to widely held perceptions, China does not target resourcewealthy locations as a main tenet of its economic approach, as suggested by critics of Chinese
investment overseas. Resources certainly are a priority, but not an endpoint or the primary
16
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motivation for Sino-African engagement. More important as an incentive for the somewhat
daunting task of engaging African states is China’s diplomatic interest:

Why does China give aid? The conventional wisdom is: to get access to resources. Yet as I hope
this book [The Dragon’s Gift] will make clear, this is at best a partial and misleading answer.
Fundamentally, foreign aid is a tool of foreign policy. China is not an exception. All donors give
aid for a variety of political, commercial, and moral reasons. Understanding the balance between
these motives gives us one of the keys to unlock the black box of China’s aid program.18

China intends to build diplomatic and friendly alliances with as many of Africa’s 53 states as
possible. Indeed, the search for new markets and a drive for economic expansion comprises a
significantly beneficial portion of Chinese strategy on the African continent, but China has not
undertaken a mere resource quest; instead, underlying objectives involve more diplomatic and
political tendencies. China views African states as fellow developing nations and potential allies
in the global arena to further Chinese political objectives. Because China has had its own
wobbly past in interacting with foreign powers, especially the West, it now seeks to gain support
and representation for its beliefs in international organizations and forums through alternative
methods.

Originally, China courted African states to shift attention from Taiwan and secure for
itself Taiwan’s seat on the United Nations Security Council: “But two other developments in the
1980s would be far more influential in shaping the evolution of aid in China: the ratcheting up of
diplomatic competition with Taiwan, and China’s decision to join the World Trade Organization
(WTO).”19 Chinese aid to Africa stems from its desire to achieve influence and international
acclaim. It would be unrealistic to think that China’s present-day rationale for engaging African
states would be based upon simply altruistic motives, as has been suggested. Though China
provides African countries with strong soft power initiatives, such an approach comes from a
desire to create positive relations in the eyes of African leaders and civil society groups. Firm
relationships with African leaders allow China to advance its goals in the global arena. For
example China once needed support in order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO): “As
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China entered the new millennium, its leaders’ economic concerns continued to center on the
United States, Europe, and Japan. Gaining access to the advanced technologies of these countries
was a key reason why China applied to join the World Trade Organization.”20 Joining the WTO
would enhance China’s ability to modernize and become more competitive on an international
level.

Economic and diplomatic advancement comprise part of China’s motivations, but
Chinese engagement with Africa emanates from its fundamental aspirations to rise as a global
power. Self-interest is masked in its attempts to earn respect with the African people. While it
does not seek to create policies that would harm the African people, China has a larger geopolitical perspective for its objectives and will promote its own well being first and foremost.
Though debate exists concerning the nature of Chinese aid and policy initiatives, obviously states
will look out for their own best interest. China is currently experimenting with its strategy for
African engagement and will take more risks. It is attempting to win allies through altruistic
gestures and attentive responses to African needs; nevertheless, it is important to note that China
has historically placed its interest above all, whether it explicitly displays its intention or hides it
behind a smile. Moreblessings Chidaushe explains such a seemingly obvious idea within the
context of other world powers’ self-driven ideologies: “But it is critical for Africa to be cautious
and take time to analyse the implications and real benefits of China’s policy. After all, China is
advancing aggressive superpower ambitions and may in the long-term harden its stance to ensure
their achievement. As with the United States, Chinese ambitions and national interests will come
first.”21 Evidently, China has multiple priorities in African engagement. China’s role in Africa
is certainly nuanced, but it aligns with China’s intent to advance a long-term strategy for
becoming a more prominent international power. One must look beyond the semi-accurate
sensationalism garnered by the media surrounding China’s intentions, but must also not forget
that China could assert an element of antagonistic competition if it so desires. Whether or not
China poses a threat to the African communities or the United States, the next two parts of this
paper will examine. Understanding the driving forces behind China’s active courtship of the
African continent, one can examine more in depth how China executes its strategy, how it differs
20
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from that of the West, and how Sino-African relations impact the United States (who has had its
own interesting history of foreign policy in Africa).

Part II.
Upon examination of China’s motivations, one can answer why it pursues African
engagement; however, how does China conduct its foreign policy, and what distinguishes it from
other powers that have relations with African states? This section will explore the existence of a
Chinese model and how it differs from other forces at work in the African continent—
particularly the U.S. strategy. It will also examine the African responses to both Chinese and
U.S. presence on the African continent, and opportunities for the differing powers to learn from
one another.

Obviously China sought to develop a more extensive foreign policy approach on the
African continent and it now has the capacity to do so. The Chinese have experienced paradigm
shifts in governance and ideology over the course of the 20th century, and have only begun to see
increased modernization and growth in the decades leading into the 21st century. Great hardship
has plagued China’s massive state, and various political decisions made during the Mao Zedong
era caused a detrimental setback for several decades to the advancement of Chinese economy
and culture. Following Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping assumed power and faced the challenge of
reconciling Maoist ideology, a mix of Communism and Mao’s personality, with the reform
needed to combat China’s regression and decreasing relevance. Deng began to encourage
economic reforms that gradually opened China to more technology and opportunities for
modernization. Over the past couple of decades, China has experienced rapid development;
now, it has the opportunity to expand its focus beyond its own borders.

Whereas many African states fall short of success stories and China’s promising growth
is attractive, African leaders and Chinese experts on Africa generally agree that China’s
development model is not appropriate for the continent.22 By no means is China an expert on
development, and it constantly experiments with its approaches until it finds one that best fits
with its ideological principles and yields benefits. Much can be learned from the Chinese, but
22
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the African states cannot replicate the methods that brought them success, as expressed in the
skepticism of former South African President Thabo Mbeki: “[Mbeki] said in 2005 that his
country would not follow the Chinese development model. He argued that Africa can not
replicate China, which benefits from massive private capital inflows that fuel rapid export-led
growth. African countries simply do not have access to this capital.”23 Though it shares a
common history with many African states as a developing nation, China cannot serve as a model
for African states because it faced different obstacles and opportunities. Where China has
enjoyed a degree of success economically, it can only lend portions of its experiences to the
African people and cannot attempt to impose its approach on the African continent. Far from
trying to do so however, it instead has sought different avenues to reach out to African states in
order to cultivate distinctive relationships rather than one universal method for all. Some
similarities in China’s strategic engagement with African states exist, but China also attempts to
approach each state as a different case.

For several decades, Western colonialism shaped Africa’s interactions with external
powers as well as their own internal affairs within their states. The methods of U.S. engagement
with African states have largely followed similar protocol established in what is known as the
“Washington Consensus,” or a general collection of neoliberal policies geared toward developing
economies. The United States has used this particular approach in its interactions with Africa,
and contrary to China it has not adapted its strategies to work with states to develop best
practices for both parties involved in policymaking: “In contrast to the Washington Consensus,
the Chinese model rejects shock therapy and the big bang in favour of a process of gradual
reform based on working through existing institutions. It a process of selective learning, or
cultural borrowing and drawing on foreign ideas, including the neo-liberal American model, as
well as many that are home-grown.”24 The U.S. has relaxed its relationships with African states
and sometimes gives the impression that African states are not worth much. Especially when its
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values clash with African ideals, it assumes the approach that it does not need to waste its time
dealing with African governments that do not want to adapt their ideas.

On the other hand, China has stepped into the picture and is giving African states
attention and listening to them: “[Former foreign editor at Time magazine Joshua Cooper] Ramo
argued that China’s mix of pragmatism and idealism was an alternative model, rivaling the
central tenets of a “Washington Consensus” rooted in the ideas championed by Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.”25 Noticeably distinctive from Western presence on the African
continent, China provides an alternative to the long-accepted “Washington Consensus.” In spite
of U.S. presence on the continent China is beginning to observe U.S. shortcomings and work to
develop its own image in the eyes of the Africans. China has observed U.S. practices, noted
where failures and successes have occurred, and then made strategic moves: “The Chinese are
experimenting, hoping that the profit motive will make these efforts sustainable, releasing the
Chinese government from having to return again and again to resuscitate its aid projects. They
will continue to change, and grow, and learn from these experiments, and we [the U.S.] would do
well to follow this progress and learn from it too.”26 Where the Chinese store their knowledge
and experiences to use in the future, the United States does not always evaluate its approach nor
does it make adaptable changes to remain progressive. Contrastingly the Chinese, as a part of
their thousands-of-years-old culture, execute calculated decisions whenever possible. They
value patience and respect in relationships thanks to the Confucian ideology in their culture for
hundreds of years, and such cultural values meld with their tactics to acquire what they have
deemed desirable. More importantly, China has asserted an approach for the African states that
rivals that of the U.S.: “Chinese diplomacy in Africa has introduced competition of development
models to the region.”27 No longer are the U.S. and the Western powers the sole directors of
African international relations and economic ventures. China’s unique approach now serves as a
gradually growing contender to that of U.S. strategy.
Nevertheless, China has still not implemented a strategic approach to the African
continent that perfectly projects its success. Experimentation remains a significant component of
25
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Chinese practices in engagement, and it constantly learns in the process: China’s turn to the
market involved an approach best described as to “cross by feeling the stones.”28 China does not
necessarily know the most advantageous way to handle its strategy, but it moves slowly and feels
its way along in the process. When China began to open itself up to economic reform, it
assumed a cautious attitude so that it could make deliberate choices based on what it learns as it
proceeds. It applies this technique to its engagement of Africa, and can use its own experiences
as an aid recipient and developing nation to enhance its understanding of African states.
Though still in its experimental stages, Chinese presence on the African continent serves
as a clear contrast to that of the U.S. Each approach differs in its strengths and weaknesses.
Contrasting in backgrounds and styles, both have elements of foreign policy that resonates with
the African people. Primarily, China has the advantage of sharing similar struggles with African
states. Though China and Africa experienced different histories, they can relate to one another
as developing nations. China has earned respect and awe among Africans:

As a CSIS report suggested, China emerged from colonial encroachment, internal chaos, and
economic destitution to achieve spectacular economic growth and infrastructure development.
Chinese leaders and strategists believe China’s historical experience and development model
resonate powerfully with African counterparts, thereby creating a comparative advantage vis-àvis the West.29

China can certainly find allies on the African continent with its background of struggle and its
preoccupation with achieving advancement and prestige. Though it has faced challenges, China
has turned them into opportunities rather than setbacks—a positive example for Africans. Hany
Besada further describes China’s unusual position that earns it an advantageous element over the
U.S.:
China’s position is strategically unique, given its ability to remain involved on issues both as a
developing country and a former member of the Non-Aligned Movement and as a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council. As such, China shares the developing nations’
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sense of humiliation, a determination to take control of their own destiny, and the need to restore
dignity following the decades of economic colonization and exploitation.30

In the face of the United States’ declining ability to uphold an engaging relationship with many
African states, China’s atypical characteristics reinforce its mounting presence on the continent.
It has received a great deal of credibility for the way it conducts its affairs with Africa and for its
increasingly adaptive approach. Contrarily, the U.S. practices a more idealistic approach that
Africans find unflattering and unfeasible at times: “While the West had an image of the future
that aid ought to create, China was the first developing country to establish an aid program.”31 It
portrays itself as understanding, but often spins unrealistic visions for Africa; moreover, it does
little to reconcile its views with African perceptions. Yet, China knows what appeals to underdeveloped nations because it has not forgotten its historical roots.
Furthermore, African states can learn from interacting with China because of its past role
as an aid recipient. As it gives foreign aid, China uses approaches that it remembers from its
own experiences to relate to African states and direct the nature of aid in a direction that the
African people will find beneficial:
[…] China’s aid system and economic engagement today reflect what the Chinese learned from
their experiments of the 1980s and from their own experience as a recipient of aid and the
business that was linked to aid. The new tools brought the practice of economic cooperation for
mutual benefit to an entirely new, intense level. As China’s reforms deepened, aid would become
even more about business; the Chinese would continue to “do well by doing good.”32

While not an appropriate model for development for African states, China serves as a sort of role
model for having experienced challenges that its African partners must also undergo. It attempts
to project an empathetic and more sensitive sentiment that will maintain the alliances established
in Sino-African engagement.
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Coming from similar backgrounds, Chinese-African relations also encourage partnerships
within the global South,33 known as South-South cooperation, for marginalized nations.
Essentially, such a concept indicates that developing nations can work together to further shared
interests, rather than relying on unequal relationships with wealthier (and sometimes
exploitative) powers: “Close Sino-African ties are a successful example of ‘South-South’
cooperation between developing countries in promoting their mutual development. As the largest
developing nation and the largest developing continent respectively, China and Africa do not
have any historical grievances against each other.”34 The promotion of solidarity allows the two
regions, with a shared past of victimization by Western powers, to confront challenges of peace
and work towards development in 21st century.35 Cooperation amongst China and Africa gives
developing nations an optimistic perspective that they can find an ally among those who have
experienced similar histories of hardship.

In addition, China can credibly assert a spirit of solidarity on the African continent
because for the most part it has a clean record: “Chinese officials are quick to point out that as
far back as the fifteenth century when Admiral Zhen He made his famous voyage to the East
African coast, China has never sought to subjugate, colonize, or enslave.”36 China stresses that
its aims align with African desires, and it can do so with Africans feeling less threatened because
it upholds policies of respect for states’ autonomy. Chinese diplomatic tactics receive
reinforcement from the promising notion of South-South cooperation. Even more appealing to
the African states, an alliance with China allows them to have a guardian against Western
interests they must find distasteful: “For their part, African governments look at China’s position
on the United Nations Security Council as potential protection against occasional harsh measures
proposed by western members of the council. China and African countries facing human rights
criticism defend each other in various organs of the United Nations.”37 South-South cooperation
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extends beyond a diplomatic strategy and a basic ideological partnership; it carries into the
international arena and in decision-making forums. China’s gradually impressive standing
among African states detracts an element of legitimacy from the United States’ oftendisconnected approaches to developing nations.
Since African states have lately begun to identify more with China, a shift of their faith
in the West now moves towards curiosity in what China can offer them. Chinese strategy is
viewed as an alternative to Western approaches, especially because it reopens opportunities to
the African people and gives them another chance to work with foreign powers. Perhaps China
simply has the benefit of not engaging in imperialistic endeavors on the African continent in the
past: “Yet, overall, I [Deborah Brautigam] frequently hear comments like this, from a thoughtful
Nigerian diplomat in Beijing: ‘The Chinese have an advantage of not having a colonial
hangover. Whatever the Chinese do for Africa is very credible in our eyes. You have to
understand this. We think maybe we can learn something from the Chinese.’”38 Understandably
so, Africans react warily to foreign powers unless they have something to offer that will not
cause detrimental effects for their countries. Western models of the past 20th century have either
taken the form of charitable donation and aid projects, or exploitative trade. Stipulations
imposed as a part of Western foreign assistance weigh down upon African governments, and
African states begrudgingly accept the terms to international deals without really having the
means or intentions to fulfill their end of the agreement. In this context, it grows increasingly
clear that: “Very few African countries have succeeded by adopting the Western models. China
sees itself as offering something different from, and perhaps superior to, the standard Western
prescription for African development.”39 China realizes African disillusionment with past
foreign relations experiences, and it knows it will offer different approaches that will better
appeal to the African people. Supposedly, the Chinese can provide agreements that will work to
the benefit of both parties. Still, challenges remain in determining the most effective ways to
maintain sustainable relationships with African states, due to the jaded nature of the African
outlook resulting from past grievances with Western powers. Ultimately, though, China has the
advantage in at least offering an alternative for African states: “Those countries that have the
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greatest difficulty establishing close ties with the U.S. and members of the European Union are
most likely to seek collaboration with China.”40 Obviously, negative memories of Western
powers will stimulate African states to explore different avenues of assistance when the option
arises.

Naturally, Africans tend to feel hopeful in light of the mounting power and success of
China, and proud that such a mighty country focuses its attention on a region of the world with a
large number of marginalized states. So often, the rest of the world perceives Africa as a failed
continent: “By the late 1980s, the West and Japan were already seeing Africa as the ‘failed
continent.’”41 Not much expectation exists for their advancement towards a prosperous and selfsufficient future. For the African people, such an absence of expectation does not encourage best
practices and the confidence necessary to move towards self-sufficiency in an increasingly
globalized world. On the other hand: “China’s role in Africa is making what once seemed a lost
continent more relevant than ever before.”42 Relevance in the international arena is exactly what
both the Chinese and the Africans seek today. Contrary to the pessimistic image of Africa and
the outlook that it will remain unable to rise to its potential as well as African wariness of foreign
intervention, China’s amplified engagement of late has captivated many on the continent. In The
Dragon’s Gift, Deborah Brautigam recounts a conversation she had with an African colleague
that illustrates an optimistic perspective:
But as we strolled in the hallways during a break, Ndubisi told me that part of him welcomed
China’s interest: “You remember,” he said, “a few years ago, The Economist did a cover story on
Africa: ‘The Failed Continent.’ My friends and I, we talked about that for weeks. It was
depressing: ‘Africa, the failed continent!’ And now China comes, and they are talking about
business, about investment, about win-win cooperation.” He smiled a bit ruefully: “Who knows?
Maybe this change will be good for Africa.”43
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China portrays exciting expectations to result from their engagement with Africa, and thus far
they are finding ways to incorporate their strategic motivations with what the Africans interpret
as appealing. Such an advantage also serves Chinese expansion interests.

Furthermore, as China seeks to rise as a global power it represents for many
underdeveloped and marginalized nations the hope for the restoration of a multipolar world—
perhaps even the recession of the United States as a forefront global leader. The United States
appears to lack an element of foresight in Africa, and China has begun to make the most of
Africans exhaustion with the “Washington Consensus.” Ndubisi Obiorah, the very colleague
with whom Brautigam discussed dismay over Africa’s label as a failed continent, explains in his
own writings that Western dominance and a unipolar world has caused discomfort for many
Africans. Obiorah further describes that China’s emergence as a global power gives hope to
marginalized countries that a multipolar world may develop. African leaders and intellectuals
would like the opportunity to have a greater role in the international arena, and do not want to be
overwhelmingly influenced [or exploited] by one power.44 Of course the African nations desire
to have some influence in the international arena; China shares the same goal, and it makes
significant strides to achieve respect. In the spirit of South-South cooperation, the developing
states intend to use each other to promote their ascent to greater relevance: “All African
governments like high level attention from the world’s most important countries. China has
developed this aspect of its relationship with Africa more effectively than any other major
power, including the U.S.”45 Because China seeks to rise as a global power, it understands how
to strengthen its relationships with African states by catering to their longings to have clout in the
international arena. Yet, China has a long way to go yet before it can amount to its full potential
to match the United States on the international stage; the United States still has the advantage of
leading the free world, but African perceptions factor into strategic competition.

As opposed to the strategy of its contemporaries, China follows through with the hopeful
values it represents for African states with an attractive style of approaching their needs.
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Effective and quick, China assesses African needs and addresses them through the promotion of
modernization and business deals backed by infrastructure: “Many African governments and
ordinary Africans regard China as a model of modernization that is more responsive to African
needs than is the West. Chinese companies have proven that they can build roads, dams,
railways, and bridges efficiently, quickly, and at relatively low cost.”46 For the states that do not
necessarily have the means to develop appropriate transportation networks and construction
projects, China produces tangible returns for its business with African states. Unequal
partnerships often hold African states back from developing successful business ventures, and
China recognizes the limits of the Africans: “The key trade dynamic between China and Africa is
that of natural resources in exchange for cheaper and more affordable Chinese products than
those the West can offer and Africans are currently able to produce.”47 Unfortunately, Africans
possess a disadvantage matched with Western trading partners—they have a pressing need to get
basic products at cheap, affordable prices, and China can deliver. At the same time, Africans
seek to promote their economies and avoid reliance on external powers. China assists with
assignments tailored to creating stability and sustainable business.

Compared to African perceptions of the Western motivations, China ties other factors in
to the quest for resources; an example of the African perspective of strategic desires. Brautigam
learns from a Nigerian diplomat firsthand the sentiment that Chinese strategy differs from that of
the West: ‘“The Chinese are trying to get involved in every sector of our economy. If you look at
the West, it’s oil, oil, oil, and nothing else.”’48 Resource acquisition is not the dominant
motivating factor in Chinese engagement with Africa, but indeed sustainable alliances and stable
market economies fall into China’s strategy for long-term relations with the African continent.
China contrives innovative ways to deal with a need to facilitate stability. Both China and the
United States seek to improve African conditions as a part of diplomacy, but Chinese strategy
concentrates largely incorporates offering affordable goods and services. Africans are at a
disadvantage matched with Western trading partners; they have a need to find cheap basic
products; on the other hand, they eventually will need to foster conditions right for good
governance long-term. The West focuses on the latter perspective, which the Africans may
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perceive as less popular, and understandably so. Yet, just because the Western approach
concentrates upon a different and equally important aspect of African need does not mean that
they should forget some of the priorities of the African people and work to accommodate their
concerns, as well.

Also unique from Western project management is China’s commitment to maintaining
development and finishing projects that it initiates. While every foreign power faces challenges
once it turns projects back over to the native people of a state, China has chosen to follow a
different route. Comparing Chinese strategy with that of the West, one can see that China
diverges from traditional methods of handling problems:
Throughout the lost decade of the 1980s and well into the 1990s, China focused the bulk of its aid
on rehabilitating the dozens of former aid projects that had collapsed or were barely limping
along, and developing ways to make their initial benefits sustainable. For every new project
launched during this period, three were being consolidated (repaired, renovated, reconditioned).
[…] Being responsible to the end became a new slogan for aid.49

China follows through with its projects, regardless of any stipulations unmet by African
governments in initial agreements. Contrastingly, the United States chooses more carefully
whom it will assist, and prerequisites and benchmarks exist for project and aid recipients to
follow. China seeks to consolidate its projects, maintain long-term success, and gradually weans
itself out of aid projects to ensure that its endeavors thrive, rather than collapse once the recipient
governments reaccept the responsibility. Such a method has received praise, despite the multiple
facets that contribute to China’s approach: “China still has a way to go and is still a relatively
poor country on a per capita basis but it can without question lay claim to the greatest povertyreduction programme the world has ever seen.”50 By no means is China’s method of conducting
business and aid assistance flawless, but the United States can certainly learn from the way in
which China seeks to encourage self-sufficiency while balancing productivity. China itself is
skeptical of Western tactics and seeks to avoid certain practices it thinks will dissuade Africans
from engagement, as Brautigam describes based on her interactions with Chinese scholars:
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The Chinese have gone to a great deal of effort to position themselves as an alternative to the aid
business as usual, particularly in Africa. “How can you reduce poverty, but live in a five-start
hotel?” a Chinese scholar asked me rhetorically during a meeting in Beijing. Western critics
might easily retort: “How can you finance a presidential palace for Sudan and call it foreign aid?”
There are differences, even in areas as basic as terminology. “We are not very comfortable with
the word ‘donor’,” a researcher in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences told me in Beijing.
“The recipient’s hand is always below the donor’s hand.” But in other ways, surprisingly, it
seems the Chinese are a lot more like the traditional donors than either side is willing to admit.51

Both China and the United States find flaws in each other’s approaches, due to different
mindsets. Nevertheless, opportunities for learning and collaboration exist as a part of their
relationship as strategic competitors rather than direct enemies. It is important to remember that
both China’s and the United States’ practices leave room for improvement when dealing with
marginalized states that are at risk of dependency on the hands that feed them.

While Chinese presence on the African continent grows more attractive, the United
States’ manner of conducting foreign policy relationships with African states unfortunately has
lost appeal. In light of increased Chinese engagement, the United States must examine its own
strategy to better understand why the Africans find it unappealing. Primarily, Western nations
tend to link public foreign policy with a need for good governance practices; Africans feel
restricted by the imposition of conditions upon aid and development policies. Often, the notion
that Western powers understand how an African state should be governed sends a superior and
condescending message to African states:

Where the West regularly changes its development advice, programs, and approach in Africa
(integrated rural development in the 1970s, policy reform in the 1980s, governance in the 1990s,
and so on) China does not claim to know what Africa must do to develop. China has argued that it
was wrong to impose political and economic conditionality in exchange for aid, and that countries
should be free to find their own pathway out of poverty. Mainstream economists in the West
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today are also questioning the value of many of the conditions imposed on aid over the past few
decades.52

Where the West typically claims that it knows best in Africa, it has not produced adequate proof
to back its statements; many in Africa grow progressively more disillusioned with the ability of
the West to offer valuable assistance. Western approaches represent idealistic aims that they
may never achieve, whereas China assumes a more realistic attitude: “For many among Africa’s
ruled who are physically and intellectually exhausted by two decades of economic ‘reform’
supposedly adopted by African government but driven by Western governments, donors and the
IFIs, China represents hope that another world is possible in which bread comes before the
freedom to vote.”53 For years, Western powers have proclaimed to have the answer to lifting
African states out of poverty, and they do not like to accept when their policies prove otherwise.
Instead of creating a mutually advantageous relationship, an unequal balance of power leads to
either exploitation by the West or often-imposing charitable assistance—two extremes. No
specific or uniform mechanisms for realistic goals of sustainability have worked particularly well
across the board.

In part, the inequality of matching Global North and Global South partners together
hinders Western intentions because each has a different focus. According to Serge Mombouli,
Congo-Brazzaville ambassador to the U.S.: “[…] China provided tangible things, while the West
pushed for something less tangible: better governance. ‘We need both. We cannot be talking just
about democracy, transparency, good governance. At the end of the day the population does not
have anything to eat, does not have water to drink, no electricity at night, industry to provide
work, so we need both. People do not eat democracy.’”54 Indeed, good governance is a valiant
and necessary goal to long-term sustainable development for impoverished African states;
however, China addresses the more urgent needs of under-developed states and can produce
substantial results. Rather than aiming to promote a specific ideology, China aids in
development to create stability: “If you look at Chinese aid, it is very different—they do very
little emergency food aid in Africa and a little bit in the health area, but mainly big infrastructure
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projects.”55 For the benefit of both Africa and China, building sustainable mechanisms within
African states will help them develop, and it ensures long-term access to raw materials and
markets in the future for China. Such a method can ameliorate poverty and promote progress
and stability, factors that need establishment in order to combat corruption and encourage better
governance practices.
In accordance with African perceptions that U.S. strategy for the most part comes across
as generally unattractive, external affairs also influence African public opinion. If the United
States asserts its power in the international arena, it no longer can worry solely about the opinion
of the American people; it must also incorporate the opinions of other people it encounters and
thosewith whom it seeks to cultivate relationships. In order to conduct effective foreign policy
and diplomacy within the African continent and international community, the U.S. must listen to
African views and maintain awareness about its international image. Though seemingly
irrelevant, the United States’ recent excursions into the Middle East have filtered into African
concepts of credibility:
Finally, global developments have an impact on African opinion. The U.S. war in Iraq, the abuses
of Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, and perceptions of U.S. unilateralism continue to take their toll
and undermine U.S. rhetoric on democracy, human rights, and U.S. intentions. The current
financial meltdown may ultimately have an impact as well, as Africans calculate that they may be
better off staking their bets on Asia’s burgeoning economies.56

Negative incidents that complicate U.S. foreign policy reflect poorly even on unrelated
operations in other regions of the world. Though not enough to strip the United States of its
legitimacy, Africans want what they interpret as best for their well-being. Actions have not
harmonized the rhetoric of stated U.S. moral beliefs, which does detract from a sense of
trustworthiness that the U.S. had originally proved marketable and attractive. Overall, U.S.
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operations in Africa have begun to lose a sense of allure and prestige in the shifting global order
and in light of Chinese experimentation of alternative approaches.

Part III.
Despite the pessimistic stigma that has gradually materialized around U.S. relations with
Africa, China’s approach to the region can provide an alternative through which the U.S. can
explore more effective methods of its own engagement. Essentially, the U.S. can learn from
China’s experimentation, just as China has observed Western successes and failures on the
continent and used them to enhance its policy construction. Because China is not perfect in its
engagement of Africa, this section will examine the positive and negative aspects of China’s
approach. China has expressed that it desires for both parties a mutually beneficial relationship,
where neither side has more of an advantage. Whether or not China continues down the path of
its stated aims, this section will explore through the context of this positive versus negative
framework of the Sino-African relationship.

Currently, China’s overarching strategy appears ever more attractive and African leaders
plan to seize such opportunities. Chinese practices in aid, business relationships, soft power
initiatives, and its overall strategies for engaging the African continent have evolved as it learns
from experimentation of what works most effectively in dealing with African leaders and
communities. With China predictably on the rise, African states want to take advantage of a
partnership with projected benefits: “[…] the cachet of China as a rising global superpower is
profoundly appealing and drives a desire to tie African economies more closely to China’s
ascension to global economic preeminence.”57 Again, China represents the hope of an
increasingly multipolar world, one in which African states will have more influence—or at least
more input. At the moment, the hope for a more inclusive relationship appears as an incentive,
contrasted to Africans’ past experiences.

Whether or not it will help promote good governance and high standards for
development, Africans find China’s only major stipulation of strategic engagement perhaps the
most appealing: the non-interference policy. Unlike Western powers, China proclaims that it
57
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practices aid and partnerships with no strings attached. Liu Guijin, China’s special envoy for
Africa once proclaimed: “‘We don’t attach political conditions. We have to realize the political
and economic environments are not ideal. But we don’t have to wait for everything to be
satisfactory or human rights to be perfect.’”58 After years of external powers projecting their
opinions onto African states, naturally African governments find a stated respect for sovereignty
appealing. The Chinese approach expresses faith in the African governments to do what they
please and make decisions suitable to their country, without asking questions. As long as some
level of stability exists, which the Chinese attempt to cultivate through infrastructure and aid
projects, the Chinese concern themselves more with business ventures and building positive
diplomatic alliances with all African states. Contrarily, the United States often expresses that it
will only assist states if they meet conditions for good governance and uphold human rights, at
least in public; sometimes U.S. diplomacy is spurred by ideological, security, or economic
interests, rather than its expressed values of democracy and freedom. No such criterion exists on
behalf of China to distinguish whom it will help or recognize as a friend.
Furthermore, China incorporates the notion of mutual respect through all areas of its
policy. The Chinese attempt to understand that which the Africans desire, and give political
leaders attention and recognition. Brautigam discovers that African leaders perceive that the
Chinese are better at providing an atmosphere of respect than Western powers: “‘China gives
Africans more respect than they get from the West.’ I was struck by how many other
ambassadors nodded vigorously in agreement.”59 China itself has expressed its intention to
convey a sense of mutual respect and equality to African leaders, especially because it has
noticed sentiments of subjugation surrounding past relationships with the West. Explicitly stated:
“[Current Chinese President Hu Jintao] said ‘China did not, does not, and will not impose its will
or inequality on other countries, as well as do anything that would harm the African people.’”60
As opposed to Western statements of the same sort, China has the history to back its claims; it
has not provided any reason for African states to distrust that it will respect their autonomy and
that it will avoid making Africans feel inferior.
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In a refreshing move for foreign policy on the African continent, China instantly makes
itself a more viable candidate for partnership and economic ventures. As a part of its long-term
strategy, China seeks to incorporate a sense of sensitivity to its relationship Africans:
According to Chinese Special Representative on African Affairs Liu Guijin, China’s relations
with Africa are based on three principles: equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect. Chinese
investment comes with no demands for making democratic reforms or promoting human rights.
While Western countries have tried to impose a market economy and multiparty democracy on
developing countries that are often not prepared, the Chinese are trying to separate politics from
business. China’s development model emphasizes political stability and economic growth first
and foremost.61

China works to cultivate relationships with African states that will produce efficiency in business
and positive politics. Surely the U.S. can learn from such a focus; China already has made great
strides in implementing such an encouraging strategy through high profile visits made by
Chinese officials and the creation of forums in which African states can actively participate.
Whereas U.S. Presidents and high level officials will venture to African maybe once or twice
during their terms in office, China conducts a different policy as emphasized by Amb. David
Shinn: “In addition, significant members of African leaders will visit China; most of them have
been to Beijing before. This is a low cost way to develop strong personal relations with African
officials.”62 High-level interactions between government officials fortify diplomatic ties and
strengthen the credibility of Sino-African relationships. China ensures that it gives its
counterparts on the African continent an adequate amount of attention. It even cultivates a sense
of camaraderie and welcome for all to participate in decision-making that relates to the SinoAfrican future. The Chinese host forums and conventions specifically designed for African
states. Over the past decade, China has held several times the Forum of China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC), a forum that provides a place for the discussion and offering of deals, as
well as for the establishment of formal relations.63 Such a mechanism can only improve the
nature of Sino-African partnerships, and it sends the message from China to the African people
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that it has a vested interest in nurturing an effective and mutually beneficial relationship for years
to come.
Additionally, the way in which China conducts its deal-making and business endeavors
expresses the notion that Africans exist as partners rather than the recipients of charity. In
another positive move for their relationship, China intends to move away from practices that may
humiliate African states; instead, it seeks to build up their confidence and their abilities to move
toward self-sufficiency through a win-win relationship: “Finally, the win-win notion implies that
Africans are free to negotiate the terms of the arrangements, and that China will be responsive to
African demands.”64 In the analysis of whether or not China can cultivate a mutually beneficial
relationship with Africans, one can observe that China certainly works toward providing
mechanisms that serve to support African interests. The way in which China conducts business
also serves as a positive factor in Chinese-African relations; debt relief and a focus upon
infrastructure aims to encourage African development and a move towards sustainability: “As
Deborah Brautigam points out, ‘In poor, resource-rich countries, which are often cursed rather
than blessed by their mineral wealth, resource backed infrastructure loans can act as an agency of
restraint, ensuring that at least some of these countries natural resources wealth is spent on
development investments.’”65 China provides vital funding for projects that develop African
nations, like paving roads, building railroads, and even constructing communication networks.
Such a focus on African needs and the development of a stable environment for economic
growth serves as a positive benefit for African well-being.

Overall, China also incorporates a lot of soft power initiatives into its strategy of
engagement, maybe more so than the U.S. By investing in communities and in Africans’
potential, China promotes growth and development. In addition, it encourages positive alliances
and fosters better diplomacy due to its wide range of soft power initiatives. Using such an
optimistic approach aligns with China’s desire to rise as a respected world power: “In this new
expanded phase of engagement in Africa, China has placed special emphasis on soft-power
aspects of its engagement, playing both to African audiences and to a broader international stage,

64
65

Cooke, 32.
Richardson, 5.

Wanee 40
where it seeks to portray itself as a nonthreatening, responsible global power.”66 Often
overlooked by the media’s depiction of Chinese greed and self-interest through its engagement in
Africa, little emerges about the positive practices China implements. Ranging from almost all
sectors of African daily life, China provides assistance—without conditions attached—in the
medical, education, and even peacekeeping fields. A focus upon increasing education, in
particular, prepares Africans to reduce poverty and work towards achieving sustainable
development. Explained well by a Confucian metaphor, Chinese reasoning for soft power
initiatives aligns with its long-term goals on the African continent:
Around 500 years before the Christian era began, the ancient Chinese sage Confucius said: “If
you plan for a year, plant a seed. If for a hundred years, teach the people. When you sow a seed,
you will reap a single harvest. When you teach the people, you will reap a hundred harvests.”
Since 2000, the Chinese government has accelerated the training component of its foreign aid,
focusing in part on transferring information about China’s own experience with urbanization,
economic growth, and poverty alleviation.67

China’s focus on education and trading information builds understanding and helps Africans, as
well as the international public image of China. Through scholarships, tourism, training, and the
exchange of ideas, China and African create greater tolerance between two very culturally
different regions of the world. Investment in humans, especially students, encourages peaceful
interaction and prepares future generations for the maintenance of proposed long-term
partnerships. Increasing peacekeeping operations also help combat the negativity associated by
China’s non-interference policy, which this section will further assess momentarily. Due to its
neutrality with African political leaders’ affairs, China avoids entanglement in African conflict
but will send peacekeepers to promote its image as responsible in the international arena because
it receives criticism for not encouraging better governance and conditions that will foster
increased freedoms and democracy.

Nevertheless, China seeks to strengthen bilateral relations rather than unilateral policies
with African states: “Realizing the important role cultural exchange can play in bilateral
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relations, China has conducted educational exchange and cooperation programs with almost all
African countries.”68 It finds that soft power initiatives and cultural sensitivity prove more
advantageous to Chinese-African relationships, compared to the more meddlesome perception of
how the West conducts its business in Africa. Thus far, the overarching strategy of China
conveys constructive and beneficial implications for the African people, a sentiment that no
amount of Western criticism can repudiate.

On the other hand, the positive factors of Chinese engagement cannot overshadow the
flaws that still remain in such experimental policy. Western powers criticize China in part
because of underlying feelings of jealousy and threats to their own stakes in Africa; but their
stated disapproval finds grounds in inevitable challenges that the Chinese have already begun to
encounter. While Chinese engagement possesses an allure for some Africans, they should still
proceed cautiously and consider the larger perspective of foreign entanglements: “Approving
China’s investment in his country, Sahr Johnny, Sierra Leone’s ambassador to Beijing, notes:
‘We like Chinese investment because we have one meeting, we discuss what they want to do,
and then they just do it. There are no benchmarks and preconditions, no environmental impact
assessment.’”69 Indeed, speed and productivity in the face of pressing needs for development
attract African partnerships. However, pros and cons exist in every scenario, and Africans
should assess the the consequences of a project before jumping into quick deals with the
Chinese. Even though efficiency appeals to Africans who do not want to answer many questions
or handle sluggish bureaucratic nuisances, they must still appraise the impact of their actions.

By now, the Chinese have begun to see some limitations to their strategic attempts of
engagement on the African continent. Opportunity and charms cannot completely eradicate the
Africans’ sense of wariness about foreign involvement and powers yearning for their goods.
Rebel uprisings have introduced security risks that the Chinese must now accommodate into
their plans, especially in conflict-prone areas. For example, when governments who have invited
China into their territories ignore civil society groups’ voices, already volatile citizens may take
a more forceful approach to project their message. One such instance occurred when the Justice
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and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan seized Chinese oil facilities in their attempt to warn
China to cease military and political support to its capitol, Khartoum.70 Khartoum forged an
agreement with China, but the government receives a lot of criticism for its role in statesponsored militias that terrorize and murder civilians. Thus, China must explore its own range of
consequences when making deals with African states, and it should assess the sentiments of
civilians in addition to its negotiations with political leaders.
Part of the United States’ decreasing role in many regions of the African continent is due
to the costs outweighing the benefits of involvement and the ability of African conflicts to
quickly escalate to the detriment of U.S. interests. At the outset of China’s more in depth
engagement with Africa, it took more risks to establish its partnerships. Now it has begun to
take a more selective approach, altering its strategies to incorporate security threats: “Anger at
China’s presence has already been translated into violence in some parts of Africa, creating
security problems for Chinese workers in Africa. […] China may have to respond to security
threats to Chinese property and personnel in the region by relying on its own military. The
dilemma is if China sends ground forces to Africa, it may be creating the image of a threatening
power.”71 Only time will tell how much of a threat China will encounter in the future, and how it
handles such risks without sending a militaristic message when protecting its own security
interests. African states may perceive any military response as combative and contradictory to
China’s peaceful, non-interference statements of engagement, so China needs to develop a
contingency plan for emerging hazards.

In addition, recent dilemmas have emerged concerning challenges in Sino-African
business projects and states’ markets. While Africans embrace investment and cheap goods and
services, they do not anticipate the Chinese to flood their markets and take their jobs: “A number
of African countries have expressed concern that Chinese textile exports are flooding their
markets and undercutting local mills. Cheaper Chinese textiles also eliminate Africa’s ability to
compete in American and European markets.”72 Healthy competition with local establishments
and fledgling businesses would promote quality products and make strides towards African self70
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reliance. The Chinese must cultivate a delicate balance for each individual African state on how
to venture into the economy without infringing upon African interests and attempts to become
self-sufficient. Furthermore, no state wants to increase unemployment by losing jobs to
foreigners; African states are no exception: “Africans also complain when Chinese investment
and aid projects result in the arrival of large numbers of Chinese workers to do jobs that Africans
are capable of doing.”73 An emerging Chinese Diaspora in Africa is not received with always
welcome, and racial segregation sometimes results from not fully bridging the wide cultural gap.
China must consider the potential for its negative aspects of strategy to take hold and threaten to
alter its course of progress in Africa. As outsiders, the Chinese must constantly work to maintain
the expressed level of respect for their African counterparts and their culture, as well as avoid
cultivating African dependency on China’s demand for exports.
Initially, too, China’s seductive non-interference policy sounds like a good idea.
However, flaws exist even to that area of China’s strategy. More and more, China finds that the
non-interference policy could become a sort of trap as they rise in the global arena; it limits their
actions and ability to influence their allies: “But, as Ian Taylor sceptically remarks, ‘for how
long…China can maintain its position predicated on “non-interference” is a crucial question,
particularly as it becomes more and more integrated into the global order and assumes the
responsibilities that come with this involvement.’”74 Along with the acceptance of more power
comes a greater need for responsibility and accountability in partnerships; China is no exception.
In particular, the international community has its focus on China, and China’s actions will not
evade critical speculation. If other international players pressure China to hold their allies
accountable for morally unjust actions, China remains bound to its non-interference trap and
enters into a dilemma, caught between external forces. For example, China’s non-interference
policy has raised fears that Western progress on fighting corruption and improving governance
will be nullified, “[…] implying that the problem of corruption in Africa is solely an African
problem.”75 The international community has a vested concern in African instability as a threat
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to security, from the threat of terrorism to internal uprisings that may jeopardize the acquisition
of resources. Western powers fear the implications of instability and do not want to see any of
their efforts to promote good governance reversed.

Beyond the dual-standard of non-interference versus accountability, critics also ponder
the feasibility of non-interference. In any relationship, expectations exist: “[…] the Chinese do
not seem to make governance worse, and although it is popularly believed that aid comes with
‘no strings attached,’ economic engagement usually does come with conditions, some of it even
(indirectly) governance-related.”76 In some areas of engagement, sacrifices will ensue from
either party. China cannot ignore the repercussions of its actions if it seeks to achieve global
clout, and naturally, expectations will result from economic engagement. Though the Chinese do
not seek to sway their African counterparts into performing based on Chinese persuasion, the
non-interference policy may recede a bit in the future as relationships become more complex.
China will face challenges in maintaining support for its partnerships if it scales back its noninterference policy.

Not everyone in Africa approves of China’s entrance into the realm of intensified
engagement practices; in particular, African leaders typically make deals with China, while the
civil society groups and individual civilians may remain skeptical of foreign interference or
courtship. A common fear surrounds the notion of the power of the purse; the suppliers of aid
must expect something in return, no? Africans might expect China to give, but they equally
anticipate that it will exert its manipulation and wonder what underlying motives the Chinese
seek. In one perspective, an African leader expresses his opinion of China’s strategy:
“It is a voluntary colonization…a danger for our security,” Anil Gayan, Former Minister of
Foreign Affairs and opposition member of parliament, had written in January 2008 op-ed in a
local paper, L’Express. “This is money from the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese state,
Beijing in fact, will decide the contours and the content of the project. What were their intentions,
their strategic designs, when the Beijing authorities chose Mauritius?” he wondered darkly.77
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While the Chinese provide opportunities, Africans may not always have a clear concept what the
Chinese find appealing in their states. They grow wary of external powers and anticipate
exploitation, as they have experienced in the past. Since Africans typically embody the
disadvantaged party in unfair pairings of power, they have license to express distrust:

Former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano charged that donors frequently form “a
common front in an unbalanced power relationship that may have dire consequences to the
recipient country.” A Ugandan official was more charitable: “The fact that a country gives you
aid makes them think they have a license to tell you how to run your affairs. Theses conditions
are probably well-intentioned, but they are humiliating.”78

Once again, African sentiments reaffirm fears and questions that stem from Chinese engagement.
While over the past decade Chinese aims have grown clearer, the African people still need
constant reaffirmation that a partnership with China will help them. The expressed desire for a
mutually beneficial relationship remains somewhat ambiguous, and the extent of the benefits for
Africans varies from state to state. The relationship between African and Chinese political
leaders has not completely resonated with average Africans; it has yet to trickle down the
expected advantages to the average people. Even in China, the people have not experienced the
predicted benefits of China’s rise to prominence, according to Dorothy Guerrero in the
Introduction to African Perspectives on China in Africa: “The majority of the Chinese people are
not too concerned about when China will become the world’s largest economy. Rather, they are
asking, ‘When will the benefits of China’s rise to superpower status start to affect our lives
positively?’”79 China’s rapid economic growth and its expansion of power to another continent
only serves as the initation of a mutually beneficial relationship; experimentation and challenges
still confront the Chinese, and general public opinion in both African states and China reflect that
fact.

Further criticism for Chinese strategy comes from the international community and its
fear of China reversing previous goals at improving African governance. In particular, the West
perceives the non-interference policy as a sort of endorsement in the actions of some African
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governments and their controversial actions. Apprehension has emerged over the perception that
China facilitates corruption and prevents democracy from taking hold. China’s unfortunate
record on human rights and its history of entanglement in arms deals with corrupt governments
have marred the face of its African engagement. In its current position, China has stil the ability
to affect the future nature of its relations with Africa: “Managed well, China can significantly
contribute to Africa’s development; managed poorly, it may encourage bad governance and
human rights violations.”80 Still in its trial and error stages, China has experience with both
positive and negative consequences to its actions and in different regions of the African
continent. If it seeks to maintain global recognition and respect as a rising power, China must
relinquish a little of its stubbornness and the opacity it enjoys in its relationships: “On the other
hand, China, in its trade with developing countries, must pay more attention to issues such as
increasing transparency, enhancing governance, protecting the environment, and improving basic
human rights in those countries.”81 While not entirely responsible for Africa’s future, it certainly
can contribute in a positive manner (seen by the good it has already accomplished with African
relationships) to good governance and development practices. In turn, enhanced stability and
progress will benefit China’s own investment endeavors and support the goal of a mutually
beneficial relationship.
Moreover, China values what the international community thinks about its actions and it
has grown increasingly aware of its image. Previously, when China kept more to its internal
affairs, it shunned the public opinion of the world. Now, as it seeks to augment its global
influence, it has become even a little self-conscious: “While the Chinese government may not
have to pay much regard to domestic public opinion, the Chinese government is historically very
sensitive about its international image.”82 Perhaps because China cannot stifle criticism abroad
like it attempts to do within its borders, it hears condemnation and perceives it as a challenge to
its ascent to global prominence. Indeed, the international community holds China to high
standards; Western powers typically share moral obligations that China does not practice.
Though it attempts to portray itself as a peaceful power that holds African interests at heart,
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China does not practice the same rhetoric and careful attention with its own citizens at home.
Chinese strategy in Africa is appealing, but in the international community questions credibility.
While the Chinese approach to engagement in Africa provides an alternative path of
development for many nations, China rarely wonders if its approach is in the long-term interests
of the parties involved. China seeks respect as a re-emerging global power, but “Chinese
commercial-driven policy towards Africa, with little interest in improving governance and
human rights, undermines China’s own efforts to be seen as a benign global power.”83 China’s
credibility is at risk, as international scrutiny increases and its “non-interference” policy—
including its arms dealing—does not decrease. China comprehends that it falls short of global
standards and that as a rising power it gains responsibility to the international community. Its
soft power initiatives not only intend to build its image in the eyes of Africans, but to seek
legitimacy in the international arena. China harbors sensitivity to global perceptions of its level
of competence and respectability. In accordance with striving for commendable practices, China
must assume responsibility for some of its dealings with corrupt governments and the
repercussions of such relationships. It is important to note, however, that the United States
cannot fully condemn China for its shortcomings due to its own less-than-impeccable record in
deal making with governments around the world, especially during the Cold War. Rather, it
must lead by example and be careful to stress transparency for China’s relationships with African
states if it does not want to maintain the same sense of transparency. Overall, China does hear
the disapproval from Western powers and has already begun to shift its policies to accommodate
it; Obiorah states: “As global branding and reputation become more important to Chinese
companies, they may become less willing to be associated with human rights abuses and
repressive regimes in Africa and elsewhere.”84 Though too early to tell, the nature of Chinese
engagement may change as it continues to work to acquiring esteem in the international
community.

In a significant move to build strong alliances and cultivate its image on the African
continent, China has expressed its desire to produce mutually beneficial partnerships between the
two very different regions. After examining both the positive and negative results thus far in the
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Sino-African relationship, a win-win approach cannot stem from one side; rather, both the
Chinese and African states must communicate their own desires and establish cooperation in
their dealings and exchanges. Most importantly, the African people are largely responsible for
the outcome and impact of Chinese engagement on their continent. Having the advantage of
distinguishing themselves from Western approaches, which have not always kept in mind the
concept of mutual benefit and representation of African interests, the Chinese have taken a
different route and have learned from Western shortcomings and Asian successes: “Like the
Japanese, the Chinese believe that the best antidote to conflict and instability is sustained
economic development. This is the strategy they adopted at home, and this is the theme of
China’s current strategic engagement in Africa. They also believe that Africans will accept that
aid can be offered in a frank exchange, as part of a relationship of mutual benefit.”85 Africans
will only accept the terms of Chinese strategy and the professed mutual beneficial partnership if
they feel like China listens to them. Rather than sizing up the benefits that either China or Africa
can gain from their partnerships, benefits for both stem from creating sustainable economic
engagement for long-term development. In addition, Chinese aid is not proportional to the
amount of resources a country can offer. While resources are significant factors in the appeal of
African markets, “[…] China’s ‘mutual benefit’ approach is about generating business.”86
Therefore, it is up to both China and the African states to work together and develop business
practices that complement one another; in theory, the mutually beneficial approach can
contribute to stability and self-sufficiency for Africa and diplomatic and economic notoriety for
China’s rise as a global power.
In order to have the mutual benefit they say they want, China must first and foremost
continue to learn and listen to African responses. Such an approach not only incorporates
African needs into the big picture, but it allows China to correct flaws in its experimental
methods of engagement: “However, if China hopes to be able to maintain its strong influence on
the continent and continue to reap the benefits of the lose relationships it has established with
African states, it will have to balance its own economic and strategic interests with the
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complaints and criticisms that continue to be levied against it.”87 China cannot address flaws and
move forward without significant input from those it seeks to engage. It desires to improve its
strategy to make it sustainable long-term, and can only do so with African feedback. Civil
society reactions to Chinese presence on the African continent often go unnoticed, but they still
represent an important aspect of those affected by China’s policies: “The fact that many African
leaders welcome China does not mean that average Africans all benefit from China’s investment.
[...] For some, China’s Africa policy, although advertised as neutral and business-friendly, is
becoming as immoral as those of Western colonial powers.”88 China not only needs to cater to
African political leaders, but it must look beyond leadership and assess the nature of individual
African states, their cultural heritages, and the level of support they harbor for their government.
Civilian satisfaction can contribute to stability, which the Chinese value more than the nature of
governance practiced by political leaders. For instance, the Chinese should listen to accounts
from average citizens when they make deals with governments: “Many Congolese are deeply
skeptical of the deal [between a Chinese corporation and the Congolese government], the full
details of which are sketchy, particularly given the levels of corruption within the government.
‘It may be win-win,’ said one Congolese student, ‘but it is China and the government in
Kinshasa that are winning, not us.’”89 Not everyone feels that their opinion maters in decisions
to make deals with Africa. If the general populace finds itself dissatisfied with foreign policy, it
may lash out in violent reactions, as China has experienced with its security challenges.

On the other hand, if China receives a wide base of support for its endeavors, it may find
that the partnership generates more successful business and benefits for the parties involved.
According to Amb. David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa still have many
difficult issues to discuss and address. Such challenges include the promotion of good
governance, the improvement of human rights, the reduction of corruption, the assessment of
environmental impact, the termination of illegal trades in products like ivory or endangered
species, the enhancement of worker safety and labor practices, the training of African
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manufacturing to enable it to compete in the global market, and the monitoring of arms sales.90
Opportunities exist for more dialogue and understanding to improve the Sino-African
relationship. Already China seeks to incorporate areas of concern into its overarching approach
to its engagement with Africa, and it intends to improve wherever it can so that the most
productive and beneficial partnership will ensue.

Whether or not the Chinese and Africans have established and can maintain a mutually
beneficial relationship remains a matter of time. With such a rapid increase in the past decade of
Chinese presence on the continent, no concrete conclusions will competently predict the nature
of Chinese relations with Africa for the years to come. All the same, assessment of the present
can teach lessons for future improvement. China’s economic cooperation with Africa has proved
mutually beneficial to an extent, thanks to its investment in Africa’s infrastructure; the vast
potential market and strategic value of African nations assist China’s rise as an international
political power. Nevertheless, China must take a sensitive approach to improve governance
practices and human rights, as well as engage local business, non-governmental, and civil society
sectors to improve mutual understanding and its image among African citizens.91 China has a
hefty task ahead; its role on the African continent grows ever more complex as it tries to develop
the best method for building and maintaining effective foreign relationships.

Gradually, the African people have begun to adjust to an increased Chinese presence on
their continent. The civil society response resulted in calls for an increased African role in
foreign partnerships, whether they harm or benefit the people. African civil society groups
understand that both the Chinese and the African people want to cultivate a mutually beneficial
relationship, and that the Chinese certainly look out for their own best interest; should not the
Africans do the same? Kwesi Kwaa Prah explains in an interview with Pambazuka News that
“China wants to pursue policies that are in its best interests and what we have to do in Africa is
also to trade and pursue policies that are in our own interests. It’s as simple as that—all states do
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that.”92 African states must take a pragmatic approach, as the Chinese have, to guarantee that
mutual benefits will indeed arrive. Other Africans tout the idea that Africans must take a larger
role in ensuring their own success. For the past century, multiple intruding powers have torn
African people apart, pushed them together, cultivated conflict, compromised identities, altered
cultural heritages, and overall generated confusion for the continent. The people cannot and
must not rely on external powers to direct their progress and assist in the development that they
want and need. As Kwaa Prah explains: “Well, I think one of the things we have to learn is that
advancement in our time must be home grown. First, Africans have to learn to pull themselves
up by themselves. Second, this process has to be based on their own cultural pre-requisites. […]
Africans have to realise that the cultural base for development has to be their own.”93 More than
ever, African states must band together in the face of foreign investment; united groups of
African people can better represent their desired interests to encourage successful partnerships
with the Chinese that will lead to self-sufficiency. Though Africans still have a long way to go
in some regards, the recognition that they can take a larger role in their future development has
begun to emerge and inspire engagement so that it is not one-sided.

With an established framework for Chinese motivations and the nature of their strategy
on the African continent, the best route for mutual benefit lies within the power of the African
people. Ultimately it is up to the Africans themselves to direct the nature of engagement within
their respective nations and through united efforts at protecting their heritage and interests. The
majority of research that analyzes whether or not Chinese engagement of African states has
positive or negative implications thus far has drawn the conclusion that African fate rests within
African hands. African states can have a say in their own futures and they must practice this
notion early in the Chinese-African relationship, differentiate Chinese presence from past
colonial endeavors, and use it to their advantage in development. They should not take the
relationship for granted and exploit the Chinese either, but they can and must assert their will to
the best of their ability for their own good: “In the final analysis, the developmental impact of
Chinese aid and economic cooperation will almost certainly vary country by country and sector
by sector. The deciding factor in each case is likely not to be China, but individual African
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countries and their governments.”94 The African people prove most qualified in determining
what they want, and they should assert that privilege more often—even to the extent of
bargaining to establish quality standards early in engagement. Though it is the larger, globally
emerging power, China is not in charge and it has not hinted that it would ever resort to the
invasion of African states. In some instances, Africans have witnessed success against Chinese
policies they may have disliked: “Pressures will mount on African governments to build a more
robust and strategic approach to deals made with China. In several instances, civil-society groups
have pushed back hard on their government for particular aspects of Chinese engagement, and in
some cases China has subsequently shifted its approach.”95 It is possible to influence Chinese
policy, and Africans continuously learn that they have the potential to represent their will. In
addition, African states must no longer point blame at foreign powers involved in their affairs;
they must take responsibility for their own futures: “‘It is futile for Africans to be pointing
fingers whether at the West or at China. Africans have to organise their side of the story as best
as they can in their own interests.’”96 In order for Africans to move forward and begin to tap into
their potential for growth and success, African states must take responsibility for what they want
and determine how they want to interact with foreign powers to uphold their long-term goals.
Nonetheless, Africa still remains limited in its ability to rise to the challenge of
presenting itself as an equal to China. Rife with conflict and division, African states contribute
to their own inferiority when they choose not to band together and assert shared goals:
For example Africa must diversify its economy by identifying strategic niches and insisting on
local beneficiation; negotiating better terms of trade at a bilateral and multilateral level as well as
using its natural resources endowment as leverage in political and economic negotiations with
international partners. However, for this to be effective Africa needs to adopt a more coordinated
and integrated approach in its dealings, whether at bilateral or multilateral level. Unlike the
Chinas and other major economies of this world that are backed up by strong political and
economic clout, Africa’s ability and capacity for leverage is rather limited.97
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Africans often experience a disadvantage in their dealings with China because of lack of
organization or peaceful coalition. Such limitations detract from mutually beneficial
relationships, and continue to foster instability. However, Africans can use established
institutions as forums for dialogue and bargaining with China; they can also strengthen their own
diplomatic relationships with one another: “China is providing African nations with a
tremendous opportunity and has made them relevant again to global policymakers, but it is up to
Africa to capitalize and drive a hard bargain so that it finally comes out winning.”98 With the
opportunity China has given African states to make them ever more relevant in the international
community, Africans must capitalize upon such optimism through their own means.

For the U.S., Sino-African pursuit of mutual benefit can provide a positive example from
which it can learn. Inevitably, a reevaluation of its approach to Africa must occur for the United
States. It suffers from declining legitimacy and a lack of cutting edge engagement with African
states, and it can learn to respect African needs on the African continent rather than imposing
policies that may not work or resonate with the people. The United States should not maintain
its historical method of engaging the African people: “The current competitive approach
[between the U.S. & China] is not beneficial to Africa and the West should not see China as a
threat to its relationship with Africa. It should not see itself as Africa’s saviour but as its partner.
The ‘saviour attitude’ is itself a cause of the competition.”99 Obviously, the U.S. strategy has not
worked well thus far, and it has deteriorated in light of Chinese advancement on the African
continent. In order for the U.S. to remain relevant as a strategic competitor of China in the
region, it must work towards cultivating more mutual respect and listen to African responses to
develop a mutually beneficial relationships like China intends to facilitate.

At last, the goal of mutual benefit in the Sino-African relationship has positive
implications as a model for the United States strategy on the African continent. Opportunities
for mutual cooperation exist among China, the U.S., and African states. All three powers have
vested interests on the African continent, and they must make the most of the different avenues
of collaboration. China serves as a strategic competitor for the U.S., but both must also
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incorporate the African interests and perceptions further into their strategy. Thus, “[i]t is
essential that Africans are part of any U.S.-China dialogue aimed at suggesting collaborative
policies toward Africa. It is equally important that the U.S. consult with its key allies,
particularly the European Union, Japan and Canada.”100 As a key international figure, the United
States’ decisions affect the international community in more ways than it sometimes notices.
Finally beginning to realize the extent to which Chinese presence has increased in Africa, now
the U.S. has competition: “As Stephen Marks pointed out in a recent editorial in Pambazuka
News, Western corporations and governments now face competition—there is an alternative to
the dictates of the international financial institutions—and this can give African states more
room for manoeuvre.”101 Perhaps a little rivalry will help the U.S. reexamine its own strategy so
that it can viably match Chinese endeavors, build back up its image, and protect its interests.
Especially through the framework of strategic competition, the U.S. can even work with China to
improve its relations with African states and provide them with the most effective and
advantageous results for partnership. Most notably, the U.S. has the opportunity to conduct
damage repair after colonization and exploitative practices on the African continent that have left
a truly unfortunate memory. It can encourage faith in the African people and support them by
trying new methods for promoting stability and sustainable development:

Ultimately, it is up to African governments to shape this encounter in ways that will benefit their
people. Many will not grasp this opportunity, but some will. The West can help by gaining a
more realistic picture of China’s engagement, avoiding sensationalism and paranoia, admitting
our own shortcomings, and perhaps exploring the notion that China’s model of consistent nonintervention may be preferable to a China that regularly intervenes in other countries’ domestic
affairs, or uses military forces to foster political change.102

No one likes to admit mistakes in foreign policy approaches, and the U.S. may be reluctant to do
so with Africa. Now the venue shift in Sino-U.S. relations to the African continent will call for
different rules and a reassessment of strategy on the playing field. After analyzing the nature of
Chinese engagement and attempting to determine the potential for a mutually beneficial
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relationship, one can see that if the Africans take a leading role in directing their foreign
relationships they can promote more equal exchanges. Analysis of the Sino-African relationship
applies to the U.S. – African relationship, and subsequently the strategic competition between the
U.S. and China, which is less about goodwill and friendship than it is about striving to maintain
global prominence. The next section of this paper will further address the implications of the
Sino-African relationship for the U.S., and identify areas of collaboration and leverage.
However, China and the U.S. must always remember the interests of the Africans if they aspire
to lucrative policies and approaches are to be successful and in alignment with their rhetoric.

Part IV.
With Chinese presence ever intensifying, the United States must now develop a suitable
response in order to protect its own interests and minimize the potential for conflict now that
China has arrived as a strategic competitor in the African region. More than ever, globalization
continues to shift the world order and China challenges the U.S. as a dominant international
player. In uncovering motivations and rationale for Chinese partnerships with African nations,
researchers have only just begun to develop an appropriate U.S. reaction to the blossoming
political, cultural, and economic changes resulting from Sino-African relations. The U.S. can
provide leverage to cooperate with China and reduce the threat it feels from China’s rising
influence, especially in the context of China’s awareness of its global image. Historically, China
has always dreaded too much foreign interference in its internal affairs; it values its identity and
autonomy. As it moves into the global community, it will face compromising some aspects of
the total control it tries to impose upon the home front.

Another perspective China provides for the Western world is its 5,000-years-old past,
evident through China’s practice of patience and focus on the bigger picture for long-term goals.
Attempting to understand China’s history and how it functions can help the United States make
effective strategic decisions in the international political arena. Greater understanding between
foreign players can serve as an instigator for reevaluation of strategies and for looking ahead to
prepare for international competition. Furthermore, it can help identify areas of cooperation;
despite areas of disagreement between the U.S. and China, an opportunity for collaboration
exists. Cooperation must occur on such issues as “countering terrorism, organized crime, and
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drug cartels and addressing global public health crises.”103 Shinn elaborates further that for
example, Africa desperately needs assistance in combating health problems, and Chinese
experience matched with Western capital could contribute to the much-needed improvement in
African health services. No single power has the ability to address all African problems, nor can
one power create effective partnerships with all African states on the continent.

In order to make any progress in assisting the African people and cultivating sustainable
development, the strategic competitor relationship must encourage powers to avoid violence and
work together. Competing interests will only deepen the divides in Africa and intensify the
struggle for each party to pursue and protect its own interests. This section of the paper will
assess the range of options available to the U.S. and areas for collaboration with China, without
compromising U.S. principles and opportunities for advancement. The premise is to learn about
Chinese engagement so as to strengthen the U.S. as its strategic competitor, while avoiding
militaristic entanglements and facilitating a mutually beneficial partnership with the African
people. Above all, both China and the U.S. must recognize that the African continent belongs to
the African people, and they should seek to engage in equal and respectful relationships, as they
are the foreigners. Positive rapport will only lead to better economic and diplomatic ties. Thus,
studying Chinese and African affairs helps offer a proper context for the United States to
reassess its own role on the African continent as well as its association with China.

First, the United States must examine the negative and hypocritical aspects of its own
presence in Africa. The Western world pressures China to improve human rights and promote
democracy, but its statements lack credibility in Africa due to its own controversial past in the
region. The U.S. should note in what areas it pushes African support away: “That said, some of
the countries doing the criticising, most notably the US and France, have supported dictators and
financed conflicts when it has clearly been in their interest. This is part of why China’s message
and strategy resonates so strongly with many African nations and leaders, the appeal of their
principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states.”104 While non-interference may
not always serve as the best approach in Africa, at least it does not send ambiguous messages to
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the international world like with the Western disconnect between its actions and words. Though
it is sensitive about its image, China cannot be expected to shift its position entirely due to
international pressure. The U.S. must practice more understanding and compromise in
international relations, too. Sometimes the U.S. forgets that cultural gaps exist between it and
other nations. The Chinese have different ideologies and rationale for their methods, and cannot
be expected to conduct their foreign affairs in the same manner that the U.S. does: “It would be
odd if the Chinese, who do not practice democracy at home, required it of others.”105 Perhaps
the U.S. places unrealistic expectations upon the Chinese that neither party can reconcile without
greater understanding and communication. Nevertheless, cultural differences cannot serve as
adequate rationale for abandoning issues like human rights altogether. The U.S. needs to sift
through the nuances of Chinese rationale and strategies to address better solutions that both
parties will accept. Additionally, the U.S. can take strides in Africa to improve its legitimacy.
Samuel J. Speigel and Philippe Le Billon suggest that critics of China could promote broader
transnational responsibilities to reduce militarization and diminish violence by disarming
themselves, rather than criticizing China and not following through with their rhetoric.106 After
enjoying decades of power and sometimes ignoring the consequences of its actions, the U.S. has
the opportunity to readjust the negative stigma accompanying disengagement between its
rhetoric and actual practices. Effective change and progress begins with constructive criticism
and self-improvement.

In addition, the United States cannot continue to conduct its foreign policy in the same
manner it has done for years; as the world changes, the U.S. must adapt accordingly to remain
relevant. China has enjoyed a considerable level of success on the African continent, and the
United States can learn from them. Indeed, China observes the U.S. and incorporates what they
have ascertained into their own strategy. Now, the U.S. must try new methods, such as
encouraging more U.S. businesses to invest in Africa and more formal collaboration between
powers, as well as promoting more accountability and oversight in African institutions and
governance.107 Every African state possesses various problems, and no universal solutions exist.
The U.S. can try to incorporate innovative ideas into its approach, as well as examples of
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Chinese successes and failures. In accordance, the U.S. must increase dialogue with China on
difficult issues. Instead of reverting to Cold War tactics to counter Chinese expansion, the U.S.
can amplify its game through positive measures. Communication is essential to the effective
coordination of assistance to Africa. According to Shinn and Eisenman, the U.S. and China will
encounter conflicting interests and need to discuss how to work together. For example, some
topics of discussion will include the coordination of emergency assistance projects, the
diplomatic strategy to end conflict in Darfur, the need to counter terrorism, and the problem of
illegal drug trades and money laundering.108 Instead of allowing tensions to build, opportunities
for collaboration must begin sooner rather than later. Because such problems plague African
states as well as China and the U.S., at times tripartite dialogue would serve the best interest of
all parties. Increased communication will promote better understanding and help determine the
most appropriate solutions for combating global problems.
Moreover, such positive strategies like the forums and conferences China hosts for
African counterparts would contribute well to U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. can make a better
effort to show African leaders prestigious recognition through creating an environment for
dialogue and the exchange of ideas between regions. High-level official visits would also
improve U.S. – African relations. Due to the expressed interest in the U.S. to promote human
rights and democracy, many African civil society groups and activists retain their hope in the
Western powers to protect them from corrupt governments. Western activists have mounted
pressure on their own political systems in the past decade, especially for issues like the genocide
in Darfur and the drafting of child soldiers in rebel uprisings. The exchange of Africans’
personal experiences with citizens in the United States, who have the right to free speech,
generates pressure and political will that will encourage the United States to offer civilians
protection from unwarranted human rights atrocities:
The ability of African human rights activists to call on colleagues in Western countries to
mobilise pressure on their governments to, for example, demand that imprisoned opposition
figures be released as a pre-condition for further aid flows, has served as an informal life
assurance for many African activists. Given that many African governments are increasingly
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turning to China for political and economic cooperation, without the “human rights and
democracy strings” often imposed by Western governments, it seems likely that a significant
source of leverage over their governments by African activists and their Western allies may be
eroded.109

Despite the appeal of China’s non-interference policy with African political leaders, the United
States still possesses bases of support and the means to offer assistance in Africa. The U.S. can
use its clout in human rights issues to its advantage, and continue to use its leverage to build
support in Africa. In the private sector, leverage of unfavorable Chinese practices can result
from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) partnering together: “African NGOs can also
work with Western NGO colleagues to mobilise threats of mass boycotts of Chinese-made
consumer goods to protest China’s arms exports to repressive governments in Africa.”110 While
China’s presence on the African continent has added a challenge to the U.S. strategy in the
region, the U.S. still has a variety of favorable tools and remains a main leader in the
international arena. It can mount leverage through representation more effectively than the
African people can against China, especially when civilians cannot protect themselves against
some of the corrupt governments in which China invests.

Instead of perceiving advancing Chinese endeavors in Africa as a threat, the United
States can explore opportunities for preemptive conflict diminution. Despite negative
perceptions (often amplified by Western media) that China’s ascent is malevolent and
threatening, further examination counters that assumption and encourages constructive
responses. Zhiqun Zhu explains that the strategic competition between the United States and
China is not zero-sum; the United States must engage China and work with the international
community to make sure that China rises peacefully and responsibly.111 The U.S. can ensure a
level of control and influence if it acts preemptively and with a realistic concept of Chinese
intentions in Africa. It should initiate tripartite discussions to assert its role in collaborative
efforts on the African continent at an early stage. Jennifer G. Cooke has expressed ways in
which the United States can proceed. The United States should engage China and Africa in
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collaborative efforts involving governments, regional organizations, and civil society to prepare
in advance for the amelioration of tension and conflicting interests. Long-term benefits through
the investment of political will can result in collaboration, and could cover a vast array of sectors
including health, agriculture, and peacekeeping: “[…] the United States should ensure
systematic, senior-level engagement with Chinese and African leadership to find common
ground and mitigate conflict.”112 With three powers working together, surely the results will
move toward fostering the best interest of the parties involved. Cooperation between China,
Africa, and the United States can develop mechanisms designed to implement responses to
conflict and promote peace processes, as well as ways to alleviate poverty and improve
economic development.

Each case with individual African states will provide different challenges, but China and
the U.S. should not avoid the possibility to contrive successful precedents and best practices.
Further evidence that the U.S. needs to engage China and Africa stems from its inability to make
effective, sustainable changes on its own in the African region:
There is also a growing realisation that traditional relations and partnerships with the West have
not helped Africa overcome the structural obstacles to eradicating poverty and reversing its
economic marginalisation. Rather than develop, Africa is haemorrhaging [sic] while the rest of
the world accumulates wealth at its expense through the unbalanced exploitation of its natural
resources and the enforcement of a distorted international economic system. Logically,
strengthened cooperation with China is seen as a way of addressing some of these structural
imbalances.113

As difficult as it may be for the United States to accept that its long-proclaimed strategies are no
longer working well for the African continent, it will serve U.S. policy better in time to readjust
its current approaches. Obviously U.S. and Western strategies have not successfully left Africa
more improved, and the U.S. cannot continue to remain a significant international power if its
policies grow obsolete. Just as education helps under-developed nations reduce poverty, a little
education for the United States from other effective approaches can help it advance, too. Thus,
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the U.S. should give Chinese tactics a chance and consider incorporating some of what they learn
into their own strategy. Rather than decry that which they do not fully understand, or become
defensive as they so often do, the U.S. must accept that its way is not always the best way; it can
meld its strategies and values with what it evaluates as successful and pertinent. Even while the
U.S. invokes morals in its policies, it does not always accept responsibility for its past mistakes
and it sometimes inhibits itself from successful growth by acting act like it knows best.
However, China has 5,000 years of history over the U.S., so surely it can impart at least a small
amount of wisdom to the rest of the world.
Just as the Chinese promote their economic and diplomatic motivations, the U.S. can
reinvigorate its own policies in those areas. The U.S. must take on a proactive role to protect its
own interests and remain a global contender. As China seeks to become a globally prominent
world power, it is an opportune time for the U.S. to reenter the strategic playing field with vigor:
“China’s expansion in Africa comes at time when U.S. interests and engagement in Africa are
growing as well. Rising energy stakes, the global ‘war on terror’ with its emphasis on weak and
failing states, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and new domestic U.S. constituencies interested and
active on Africa and conflict resolution have all generated a dramatic increase in U.S.
commitments.”114 Even while the media often influences public opinion within the U.S. on
African issues and consistently portrays negativity, the private sector has recognized areas in
which it can influence U.S. international policy to benefit the African people. Philanthropic
NGOs and activist groups build a positive stigma around U.S. image, and the time is ripe for the
U.S. to upgrade its promotion of diplomacy in Africa. Currently, the U.S. government struggles
with its budget and it examines areas where it can cut extraneous costs; officials have largely
categorized foreign aid as unnecessary. However, foreign aid proves one of the most effective
tools for diplomacy and is widely used as a tactic of China to build rapport with underdeveloped
states. While typically the U.S. only wants to give aid to the countries that support its policies
and values, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton comprehends the need for proactive aid in foreign
policy:
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Clinton responded that the United States needed to compete with other powers for influence in
countries that may not currently support U.S. foreign policy, and said the president's fiscal 2012
budget for international affairs responded to the need for fiscal prudence. “We scrubbed this
budget and made painful but responsible cuts,” she said. “These [foreign policy] missions are
vital to national security and I believe with all my heart that this would be the wrong time to pull
back.” 115

As the United States makes critical decisions over the next few years in its foreign policy
strategy and its aid to African states, it cannot retract aid from its toolbox of resources. Perhaps
the more important question surrounding aid to Africa is not whether it should comprise a part of
diplomatic strategy; instead, foreign policy analysts should discuss how the U.S. could use its aid
to effectively to maximize its diplomacy and produce benefits for the African people. In
addition, the U.S. could pair its diplomatic assistance policies with finding ways to maximize
economic engagement: “The United States can do more to encourage economic engagement and
infrastructure in Africa. In addition to missed business opportunities, the United States may be
losing soft-power potential as more aggressive and forward-looking investors—in China, India,
Brazil, and Russia—gain ground in Africa. The U.S. government could do more to encourage
and support U.S. investors in Africa.”116 With its recent struggles around an economic recession,
the U.S. could perhaps improve its business ventures in Africa. Though they might not initially
provide much return, diplomatic ties could also strengthen as a result.
Where the United States must examine its current engagement and attempt to reconcile
the positive and negative factors of its impressionable history on the African continent, China
had a positive, clean slate there from the beginning. It could try a range of different approaches
to successful aid and development because it long-observed what Africans did and did not like;
thus, China began to implement its experimental ideas. The U.S. can learn from the innovative
methods China brings to Africa and developing states in general. For example, China has
applied a business technique from within its borders to African states. Even though the
overarching Chinese model is not appropriate for African development, the Chinese have
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transported the more lucrative aspects to the new African venue. One such project, China’s
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), have widely emerged across the African continent: “In 2006,
China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that overseas economic zones would become key
platform in the ‘going global’ program. China would support its companies to establish fifty
overseas economic zones in countries around the world.”117 In an unprecedented move, China
undertook the large project of implementing its model of rapidly growing industrial zones to
nations other than its own. Such a move is uniquely Chinese for its engagement with Africa.

While too early still to determine the success of the SEZs outside of China, the U.S. may
need to attempt bold and inventive moves to match Chinese progress. Perhaps even the U.S. can
coordinate with China within the SEZs. Either way, Deborah Brautigam reiterates that:
“Exchanging views, rather than lectures, on lessons learned and approaches to aid and
cooperation could lead to more useful engagement between China and the West.”118 It is at least
worth the attempt to cultivate better understanding between China and the U.S. If the U.S.
struggles with its ability to provide a significant amount of foreign aid, it can learn from the
creative ways in which China approaches aid. For example, China forgives large amount of
debts; rather than spend more money on Africa, the United States could leave alone the money it
has already spent and perhaps forgive a selected amount of African debts. Another lesson
learned from China, the U.S. could back foreign aid with resources so that the Africans can find
ways of repaying its debts in return for matching U.S. needs and interests. The Chinese think
outside traditional donors’ perspectives: their original ideas for approaching foreign aid serve as
what Brautigam describes as a “catalyst for investment.”119 The US needs to reevaluate its
strategic interests in Africa and how it perceives aid as a tool so that in various situations with
African states, it can devise the most appropriate economic and diplomatic response.
In order for the United States to effectively evaluate its policies in Africa and fully realize
the extent of its strategic competition with China, it requires a shift in emphasis. The United
States must become more open to new ideas and the possibility that it may not always be the
leader of the international community. Already, globalization has metaphorically diminished the
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size of the world, and global perceptions have changed in both the Global North and South. The
United States’ role is uncertain, but according to African civil society perspective the argument
has emerged that China’s increasing sphere of influence in Africa could diminish previous
patterns of Western dominance and opportunities for leverage over the continent. Not only would
China’s presence challenge Western hegemony, but it could shift international dynamics.120
While to an extent, Chinese advancement still has a long way to go to reach the level of
influence that the United States enjoys in the international arena, its rapid growth and presence in
the global community will challenge the United States eventually.

Recently, the world has already witnessed an escalation of under-developed nations
defying perceptions of hierarchy and power with uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and other states in
North Africa. At the present, the U.S. has the opportunity to redefine its role after the ambiguous
signals it sent to the world during the Cold War struggle. Its rhetoric did not align with its
actions and its support for governments often proved hypocritical to the professed moral values
and ideologies of the United Sates. According to Cooke, the United States uses too much
rhetoric about the promotion of democracy, and it should work on strengthening governance and
civil society through support of oversight and accountability in institutions as well as for civil
society and the media. Such institutions can benefit citizenry, environments, and economics in
the long-term for African states.121 Now more than ever, the U.S. can modify its international
presence and improve its image. It must begin to shift from backing dictators to combating
hypocrisy and promoting civil society and mutually beneficial relationships with lesser powers.
Additionally, the U.S. can develop better mechanisms for oversight and responsible interactions
with African political leaders, without imposing its will upon them. It can use positive
techniques to build up Africa, rather than maintain its previously superior and condescending
attitude. It is not too late for the U.S. to alter its position in Africa, and a little healthy
competition from China should be channeled into reconstructing quality approaches.

Conclusion
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Seemingly a new phenomenon, the Sino-African relationship will only strengthen if the
Chinese continue to appeal to African states and if they listen to the responses of the African
people to create a mutually beneficial relationship. With more research emerging that
encourages the African people to take control of their futures and direct the course of their
relationships with external powers, one cannot predict in what state the Chinese presence will
appear on the African continent in the next ten years. However, current indicators point to an
increased Chinese presence in Africa as China finds ways to assert its power in the international
arena and further expand its influence beyond its borders. At the same time, the United States
role in Africa remains static and is more apt to decline than progress—unless the U.S. takes steps
to reevaluate its standing and approaches to diplomacy with the African states. It must
reinvigorate its own strategy if it intends to protect its interests in Africa as well as stay ahead of
China in the realm of strategic competition. In addition, the African states need not to reduce
their dependency on foreign powers like the U.S. or China by creating partnerships that promise
to ameliorate their poverty levels and improve business endeavors. More important, they desire
to interact with major world powers in order to participate more fully in the international
community and make their voices heard; if the United States fails to respond to this adjustment,
Africans will turn elsewhere. The same idea applies to China; it must maintain a riveting and
beneficial strategy in the eyes of the African people because without their support, the Chinese
will have no capacity to remain engaged in African business and diplomacy.

Ultimately, the United States can and should protect its international interests and goals,
especially in Africa. It does not have to foster sensationalism and irrational fear around China’s
rise, but it should maintain a clear, focused perspective to develop an enduring strategy in
response. China’s extensive history and patient demeanor have always allowed it to harvest
long-term point of view, while the United States usually plans for the short-term. Such
shortsightedness is harmful to the U.S.; it is absolutely necessary that it take a more proactive,
rather than reactive, stance in all aspects of its policymaking. If the United States concentrates
too closely on temporary solutions for its policies, it will miss the larger picture and windows for
advancement. Already, China has manipulated itself into an advantageous position. Horace
Campbell explains the significance of China’s movements in Africa: “[…] in less than a decade
the decline of the US has accelerated and the Chinese have been able to break out of US military
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encirclement without engaging the US militarily.”122 The United States cannot remain too
nonchalant about the increasing Chinese presence on an under-developed continent; nor can it go
too far in concluding that China has begun to prepare itself for direct conflict with the United
States. Instead, the U.S. must seek valuable information and remain informed about China’s
intentions and strategies. It must continue to evaluate its own foreign policy relations and
incorporate what it learns from others to remain internationally relevant.

While the U.S. has preoccupied itself in other regions of the world lately, including the
Middle East and even Asia, the Chinese have expanded the terrain for internationally strategic
competition in a way that the United States has not yet experienced. The U.S. is not fighting
proxy wars as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War; yet, China still constitutes a
challenge. Shinn and Eisenman place the U.S. and Chinese strategic competition into context:
“[…] Africa has never been central to either American or Chinese policy. While this will
continue to be the case into the foreseeable future, the role of Africa is changing for both the
U.S. and China.”123 Even if Africa does not necessitate an immediate need for the United States
to respond, China’s advance into the region does require U.S. attention. China has examined the
Western successes and failures on the African continent for decades, and it has worked to set
itself apart by incorporating the knowledge it has acquired into its strategies for cutting edge
business and political engagement. It has a past with which other underdeveloped and
marginalized nations can identify, and it facilitates a relationship that appeals to African states.
Also, China is open to trying new methods of engagement with African countries, whereas often
the West has preconceived notions of what will or will not succeed and does not reevaluate its
policies based on contradictory evidence. Nevertheless, the U.S. has the means to promote
progress and development in Africa, as well as to counter China in strategic competition.
Furthermore, it has the opportunity to coordinate with China for the benefit of all parties
involved. As China appears to gain traction in Africa, its bid for global prominence could
present a needed wake up call for the U.S.; hopefully it comes early enough for the U.S. to
understand the implications of Chinese engagement in Africa, and realize that it should act now.
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